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 Foreword 
The International Land Coalition (ILC) was established by civil society and multilateral 
organisations who were convinced that secure access to land and natural resources is 
central to the ability of women and men to get out of, and stay out of, hunger and 
poverty.   
In 2008, at the same time as the food price crisis pushed the number of hungry over the 
one billion mark, members of ILC launched a global research project to better understand 
the implications of the growing wave of international large-scale investments in land. 
Small-scale producers have always faced competition for the land on which their 
livelihoods depend. It is evident, however, that changes in demand for food, energy and 
natural resources, alongside liberalisation of trade regimes, are making the competition 
for land increasingly global and increasingly unequal.  
Starting with a scoping study by ILC member Agter, the Commercial Pressures on Land 
research project has brought together more than 30 partners, ranging from NGOs in 
affected regions whose perspectives and voices are closest to most affected land users, to 
international research institutes whose contribution provides a global analysis on 
selected key themes. The study process enabled organisations with little previous 
experience in undertaking such research projects, but with much to contribute, to 
participate in the global study and have their voices heard. Support to the planning and 
writing of each study was provided by ILC member CIRAD. 
ILC believes that in an era of increasingly globalised land use and governance, it is more 
important than ever that the voices and interests of all stakeholders – and in particular 
local land users - are represented in the search for solutions to achieve equitable and 
secure access to land.  
This report is one of the 28 being published as a part of the global study. The full list of 
studies, and information on other initiatives by ILC relating to Commercial Pressures on 
Land, is available for download on the International Land Coalition website at 
www.landcoalition.org/cplstudies.   
I extend my thanks to all organisations that have been a part of this unique research 
project. We will continue to work for opportunities for these studies, and the diverse 
perspectives they represent, to contribute to informed decision-making. The implications 
of choices on how land and natural resources should be used, and for whom, are stark. In 
an increasingly resource-constrained and polarised world, choices made today on land 
tenure and ownership will shape the economies, societies and opportunities of tomor-
row’s generations, and thus need to be carefully considered. 
Madiodio Niasse 
Director, International Land Coalition Secretariat 
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 Executive summary 
On March 17, 2009, the fall of the Ravalomanana government in Madagascar resounded 
in the national and international media. The event assumed a unique character, as land 
questions appeared to be among the claims that led to the uprising. Accusations of 
“selling off the ancestors’ land” were brought against President Ravalomanana following 
the revelation of a project to lease more than one million hectares of agricultural land, 
under obscure conditions, to a South Korean company, Daewoo Logistics. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, a number of land acquisition projects in the agricultural 
sector have been announced or revealed by the press. The little information available 
implied that they were aimed at the production of food commodities, agrofuels, or wood. 
The land areas in question comprised between 1,000 and 200,000 hectares per invest-
ment project. 
This study presents the evolution of large agricultural investments in Madagascar 
between 2005 and 2010. Commissioned by the International Land Coalition (ILC), it was 
realized by the Malagasy Land Observatory (l’Observatoire du Foncier à Madagascar) and 
CIRAD. Its aims are to: 
° Examine the establishment processes of the Daewoo and Varun projects, both of 
which were eventually abandoned; 
° Describe the status of land investment projects, by differentiating between those that 
have simply been announced and those that are effectively underway; 
° Determine the operators’ objectives with regards to land acquisition and to pinpoint 
the status of their applications for land; 
° Examine the legal framework that is meant to regulate these investments; 
° Analyze operators’ practices in accessing land as well as the means of regulation, both 
formal and informal, of these investments at the local and national levels; 
° Raise core questions to be addressed in the framework of a future debate on the role 
of these investments in the agricultural sector and on the institutional mechanisms 
that need to be reinforced in order to improve the transparency of land acquisition 
projects, to clarify the procedures for investors to follow, and to limit negative social, 
economic, and environmental impacts. 
Daewoo and Varun: “lose-lose” strategies of agribusiness 
projects 
In November 2008, Madagascar was propelled into the international headlines following 
information published by the press that the South Korean company Daewoo Logistics 
was negotiating with the Malagasy government for the transfer of 1.3 million hectares of 
arable land in four coastal regions of the country. This large-scale project was immediate-
ly denounced by the opposition to President Ravalomanana’s regime, which accused him 
of selling off the nation’s heritage to foreigners. This accusation was reinforced by press 
revelations of another agribusiness project planned by the Indian company Varun 
 International in the region of Sofia, which targeted more than 200,000 hectares. The 
protest was orchestrated in part by international intermediaries, who mobilized public 
opinion in Western countries. In Madagascar, these protests combined with other 
demands and contributed to the fall of the government in March 2009. 
These two agri-food projects, aimed at developing large areas of land, both raised similar 
issues. Both have now been suspended and both investors have left the country. The 
companies involved devoted more time to negotiating access to land with central 
government authorities than with the populations and the regional and local govern-
ments of the targeted land. The absence of transparency in these negotiations and the – 
at best – hasty negotiations at local level drove these projects to failure. The terms of the 
land contracts appeared to be extremely unfavorable for local people.  
Status of investment projects in the agricultural sector 
Following the abrupt cancelation by Daewoo and Varun of their agricultural projects and 
the new government’s assumption of power, the investment dynamic has slowed down, 
although without truly dying out. 
Of the 52 projects announced since 2005, one-third have not gone further than the 
prospecting phase or have stopped. The main reasons given by investors are, on the 
global level, the financial crisis and, at the national level, the political situation and 
difficulties in accessing land. Not having obtained the guarantees required by banks to 
obtain financing, some investors, particularly in the agri-food processing sector, have 
abandoned their projects. Only a quarter of the projects announced to date have been 
maintained, and are advancing slowly. The rest remain in the set-up phase.  
According to announcements made by operators, close to three million hectares of land 
have been targeted. These numbers are significant considering that Madagascar has two 
million hectares of land cultivated by 2.5 million family farms. Estimates of total potential 
cultivatable land in the country vary according to different institutions and different 
methodologies: Madagascar has eight million hectares of arable land according to the 
Ministry of Agriculture (2008), but 15–20 million hectares according to the FAO (2007). 
The land targeted thus represents 37% in the former case and 15–20% in the latter.  
Because of their soil quality, favorable rainfall for crops, the presence of vast, relatively flat 
areas of land, and above all their proximity to the sea in order to ship produce, Madagas-
car’s coastal lands are those most in demand by investors. Since 2005, the majority of 
approaches have involved the regions of Boeny, Sofia, Melkay, Menabe, Antsinanana, 
SAVA, and Atsimo-Andrefana. 
In reality, the areas involved in projects currently underway represent no more than 
150,000 hectares – 20 times less than the areas initially announced – while the areas 
actually in use represent only 23,000 hectares for the moment. The fact that “only” 
130,000 hectares are currently being targeted tends to calm the debate related to the 
risks of land acquisition by agribusinesses, but does not resolve it altogether. The target-
 ing of such a high proportion of total arable land reserves, within the space of five years, 
raises serious questions about land use planning and the relationships between family 
agriculture and agribusiness.  
The case of Madagascar demonstrates the diverse origins of investors. More than two-
thirds of investors between 2005 and 2010 were foreigners (the majority of European 
origin: from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Holland); the remainder 
were Malagasy. 
The ongoing projects are aiming primarily to produce agrofuels, as most of the agribusi-
ness projects have been canceled. The majority of promoters of foreign projects foresee 
the production of jatropha on areas of between 10 and 30,000 hectares, deploying a 
production model based on a wage system. Most of the Malagasy companies are 
focusing on adding value to sugar cane production in rural areas and are concentrating 
their activities on the industrial processing of sugar cane into ethanol. Exportation is the 
common point among these projects.  
Investors’ land strategies 
Most often, foreign operators want to lease, rather than buy, land. They hope to sign 50-
year leases and, based on the information obtained, to pay approximately 2,000 
ariary/hectare in rent (€0.60/hectare). This preference for renting arises from a desire to 
limit initial investment costs and to avoid tying up capital. Operators also believe that 
renting will be less socially controversial at the local and national levels.  
The Malagasy investors, on the other hand, want to buy land. Their projects are limited, 
for the most part, to industrial processing activities and are based on farmers’ inputs 
(sugar cane), and their needs are limited to small areas of land where they can establish 
nurseries and construct buildings (storage, factories) – thus less than 50 hectares.  
Investors hoping to develop large-scale crops are seeking land with similar characteristics: 
° Good pedo-climatic1 conditions adapted to the planned crop and the level of 
mechanization; 
° Non- or under-productive, or unowned land. The land targeted is supposed to be 
State-owned land. Steps to access land are overseen closely by the State land services, 
and applications for more than 50 hectares must be considered by the Council of 
Ministers; 
° For the most part, proximity of a national road for the transportation of raw materials 
and inputs as well as the proximity of a port, maritime or river, for the shipping of raw 
or finished products (large investors, such as Daewoo and Varun, were not as limited 
by the constraint of accessibility and envisaged the construction of infrastructure of 
their own).  
                                                                  
1 That is, pertaining to soil and climate. 
 Contrary to all expectations, given the estimates of the potential extent of arable land 
(between eight and 20 million hectares: see above), investors have found themselves 
competing for access to land. This indicates that the amount land fitting all the favorable 
investment criteria is not as extensive as initially forecast. Estimates of millions of hectares 
of arable land potentially available based on pedo-climatic criteria have proved to be 
based only on partial information, as the majority of investors are seeking not only arable 
land but above all plain land, i.e. accessible at a lower cost. 
With the exception of a few Malagasy investors who have succeeded in buying plots of 
less than 50 hectares of land, most investors have been unable to finalize procedures to 
obtain a lease. Some investors began these procedures more than two years ago. The 
length of this process is explained by the difficulties encountered on the ground in 
obtaining plots of undeveloped land of between 10,000 and 30,000 hectares and – above 
all – by the current political context. To prevent delays in their projects and to begin 
agronomic trials, investors have established their first plantations (nurseries or initial plots) 
on land rented informally, thanks to agreements with private Malagasy owners, mayors, 
or representatives of regional governments.  
Furthermore, without a lease contract signed by the Minister of Town and Country 
Planning and Decentralization, operators have had difficulties in securing financing, as, 
before granting credit, banks require guarantees confirming their effective access to the 
land. Operators have thus found themselves in a difficult situation: they have incurred 
costs related to various procedures over a period of two years and have initiated their first 
nurseries, but they are not assured of obtaining credit. For some, this situation has 
contributed to halting their projects. 
Legal and institutional framework for investors in the 
agricultural sector 
Three bodies of law currently regulate the establishment of investors’ operations in 
Madagascar: the Law on Investments, the Decree to Make Investments Compatible with 
the Environment (MECIE Decree), and the Land Laws. Their implementation rests with 
three specific institutions: 
° The Economic Development Board of Madagascar (EDBM). The function of this 
institution, created in 2008 and linked to the Presidency, was initially secured until 
2009 by international public aid funds (from the World Bank). Its objective was to fa-
cilitate different procedures for investors: the creation of a Malagasy legal entity (the 
only constraint is that one associate must be a registered resident), obtaining a visa, 
registering in the commerce registry, and issuing an “authorization to acquire land”. 
However, the EDBM is currently inactive due to the suspension of international financ-
ing. 
° The National Office for the Environment (ONE). ONE, in collaboration with the 
environmental units of various ministries, is in charge of overseeing the application of 
and monitoring the MECIE Decree. For all agricultural projects exceeding an area of 
1,000 hectares, this Decree obliges the investor to undertake an environmental im-
 pact assessment (EIA). This integrates an analysis of the environmental impacts as well 
as the social and economic impacts of the project. It also includes local-level consulta-
tions with authorities and the population, in the presence of an evaluation commis-
sion composed of a representative from ONE and from the relevant ministries. ONE 
validates the study, which then leads to the issuing of a permit and the establishment 
of a list of requirements. The evaluation commission is responsible for enforcing the 
list of requirements. 
° State-Owned Land Administration (Services des Domaines). The major change imposed 
by the land law of 2005 was a switch from a presumption of state ownership to a 
presumption of private ownership. State-owned land has thus been restricted to land 
registered in the name of public actors and unoccupied land, which falls within the 
competence of the State-Owned Land Administration (decentralized and central land 
services). Untitled private land – whether held individually or collectively – falls under 
the competency of the local government (commune). The latter can issue, via its local 
land office, land certificates to users who request them. Land certificates have virtually 
the equivalent legal value of a title.  
Although the purchase or leasing of land can be negotiated through land title or certifi-
cate holders, investors in search of large areas tend to prefer State-owned land. Applica-
tions are thus addressed to the State-Owned Land Administration, which must verify that 
the land in question is State-owned and does not encroach on private titled land. 
For Malagasy individuals or legal entities, the purchase of State-owned land implies a 
preliminary stage of registering in the purchaser’s name. For foreign investors, only the 
establishment of a long-term lease of between 18 and 99 years is possible. In theory, it is 
possible for foreigners to purchase land by creating a Malagasy legal entity, by applying 
for an “authorization to acquire land” from the EDBM or by establishing themselves in the 
Agricultural Investment Zones (zones d’investissement agricole, or ZIAs). In practice, even 
when foreign investors create Malagasy legal entities, they do not want to buy agricultur-
al land. Furthermore, as decrees intended to enforce laws related to the “authorization to 
acquire land” and the ZIAs have not been promulgated, investors cannot resort to these 
procedures. In addition, the rental of State-owned land implies a preliminary step of 
registering in the State’s name. 
The investor is thus supposed to follow an obligatory passage directed by these three 
institutions. While none of the institutions has the required competencies to select 
projects, they must ensure in meeting the legal requirements that: (i) the investor is 
registered for and pays taxes; (ii) the land rights of the people (untitled private property, 
titled private property) are respected and that those of investors are secured; (iii) harmful 
environmental impacts of the project are limited; and (iv) social and economic conditions 
offered to residents or to people employed by the projects respect the minimal norms.  
 From the legal framework to practices on the ground 
There is obviously a certain distance between the legal framework and practices on the 
ground, which can be explained by three main factors: 
° Large investments represent a new phenomenon, for which public services, under-
endowed in both material and human resources, are not necessarily prepared; 
° The laws directly or indirectly governing investment can be more or less well mas-
tered and interpreted differently by public officials, investors, and citizens; 
° While the steps imposed by legislation are generally respected (application for land 
through State services and the EIA), sometimes favors granted by agents of the ad-
ministration can allow not only accelerated handling of cases, but also a reduction in 
certain constraints. 
A one-stop service provider struggling to fulfill its 
functions 
An analysis of the procedures of operators and the role of the institutions with which they 
interact reveals that investors’ procedures are far from being linear. Several have gone 
back and forth between state services and local and regional governments. The EDBM, 
which should be the sole office directing investors, struggles to fulfill its role. Investors do 
not use all of the EDBM’s services, and the agency, with its financial difficulties, cannot 
systematically respond to operators’ demands. Finally, if mayors and local populations in 
the rural areas targeted are informed at all, they are usually at the end of the chain and 
consultation remains symbolic. 
Impact assessment: relevant safeguards, uncertain control 
mechanisms 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) mandated by ONE has been carried out (or is 
in progress) by almost all of the operators concerned. A condition of accessing land, it 
represents a first environmental and social safeguard. It could, however, be reinforced:  
° The lack of any clear distinction between the promoter of a project and the entity in 
charge of the EIA, as well as the absence of any obligation to have it validated by a 
certified body, calls into questions its quality and validity ; 
° Since it does not include an economic evaluation, the EIA in its current form has no 
role to serve as a basis for project selection; 
° The EIA requires operators to consult local populations and authorities of the territo-
ries concerned (leaders of fokontany, mayors, and main representatives of regional 
government). This consultation has the advantage of helping to disseminate informa-
tion and inform the debate at local level. However, questions arise regarding the true 
representativeness of the villagers attending meetings and the actual level of consul-
tation. Furthermore, information is not disseminated more widely, resulting in civil 
society not having in-depth knowledge or a fortiori a right to observe what is happen-
ing. 
 ° The operator’s commitments, formalized in the list of requirements developed at the 
conclusion of the assessment and the consultations on the ground, are often more 
detailed and quantified on environmental issues than on social issues. Ambiguity 
concerning social and economic obligations makes it difficult to monitor and control 
these requirements, let alone impose sanctions for lack of adherence. Furthermore, 
questions persist regarding the means available to the authorities concerned (re-
gional environmental units, Ministerial services) to execute control in an effective and 
coordinated way. 
° The fact that one operator did not conduct an EIA questions the capacity of ONE and 
the specific judicial authorities to force investors to respect the law. 
Improving processes to secure populations’ and investors’ 
land rights  
In 2008, Madagascar presented a paradoxical situation. The government lauded, on one 
hand, the securing of local people’s land rights thanks to the implementation of new land 
laws, while on the other hand it welcomed foreign investors by agreeing to transfer large 
tracts of land to them. A desire to secure the rights of farmers "from the bottom" coin-
cided with a desire to impose the development of very large agricultural firms "from the 
top". Up to now, the current government has not defined its position towards the 
question of land allocation and has not signed any contracts in the agricultural sector 
(however, foreign investors in the mining sector have recently been granted mining 
contracts).  
Land acquisition or lease applications mainly concern lands presumed to be unoccupied 
(without occupants), a priori State-owned land. So as not to deny the rights of owners 
and users, a Commission for State Ownership Recognition (CSOR) has to verify that the 
allocated areas really are unoccupied. According to the laws, lands that are titled private 
property (formalized by a title) or untitled (formalized – or not – by a certificate) must be 
removed from the area targeted by an applicant (buyer or lessee). Early case studies 
reveal that:  
° The realization of land surveys by the CSOR is not easy due to technical problems 
(absence of updated land-use maps, scale of the plots). Furthermore, it can be biased 
by corrupt practices. 
° The local population’s claims depend on the type of land involved. While cultivated or 
forest plots are relatively straightforward to secure, it is less evident for pastures (in the 
zones investigated, users did not have certificates). In a number of projects, pasture 
lands are the object of negotiations with investors: populations accept that these 
lands will be used by the operator, provided that the latter plans new pastures or 
produces grazing crops on the lands that it will occupy. Social demands are eased 
further by jobs created, or by promises of jobs made, by operators. 
° In the case of opposition at the local level, there is a risk that the dispute will be 
resolved at the level of State services, without the participation of the populations 
concerned and under the influence of strong political pressure. 
 ° If there is no negotiation, or if the negotiation is neglected, the rural population’s 
reactions can be strong, and can be manifested in the burning of plantations – this 
has been noted in several cases in the past.  
Some investors perceive that procedures to access land are long and complex, particular-
ly due to the lack of information regarding the order and nature of the documents that 
must be provided. Others have succeeded in advancing their applications quickly by 
investing considerable energy in following up, while some have had to incur (unre-
corded) expenses to accelerate the process. The low leasing price (less than €1 per 
hectare), which attracts operators, often masks the real total cost of preparing the 
contract, negotiating with the local population, local governments, and the technical 
State services, and ensuring its progress. 
Normally, a purchase or lease contract guarantees the rights of the acquirer or lessee. 
With regard to lease contracts, numerous clauses specify the rights and duties of the 
lessee and the State, and conditions that could lead to termination of the contract (e.g. 
unrealized scheduled works, non-payment of rent). However, the risk of the State 
opportunistically breaking the lease contract, and evicting the lessee, remains in the 
current context. In the agricultural sector, certain symbolic cases of the administration 
breaking lease contracts have already taken place. 
Points for debate and reflection related to a regulatory 
framework for investment 
Two models of development currently seem to be in opposition to one another. The first 
depends on national and foreign private investment and on the creation of agribusiness 
activities, partially oriented towards exports, which its promoters hope will lead to 
positive effects and economic growth. The second is based on family farming and aims to 
strengthen food security by protecting existing land rights and by promoting a set of 
public actions in support of farms. 
Reality shows that these two models coexist and that one is not going to disappear in 
favour of the other. Thus, debates need to avoid a bipolar and simplistic argument (for or 
against one model or the other) that reverts to discourses tainted with ideologies. 
Debates must, on the contrary, provide elements for a rural development policy that 
could combine both models. It is noted, moreover, that such combinations already exist 
and deserve to be better understood. 
The challenge is to accentuate the mutual interests of investors and family farmers and to 
anticipate the principles and institutional framework for agribusiness investments in 
Madagascar. This study, through its first observations, allows for the proposal of a number 
of options for the way forward.  
The implementation of a regulatory framework for investment in the agricultural sector 
supposes the observation of several points: 
 ° Make information on projects transparent and public; 
° Reflect on the institutional, technical, and financial viability of a one-stop service 
provider for investors.  
For access to land and the negotiation of lease contracts, the debate should cover the 
following issues: 
° Undertake obligatory consultations with local populations, not only during impact 
assessments, but also before beginning procedures to access land; 
° Plan for the validation of these consultations by a third party; 
° Monitor that existing land rights are respected, by: 
° Opening the CSOR to a wider number of actors: representatives selected by villag-
ers, members of local land offices, expert witnesses to oversee the proper roll-out 
of procedures; 
° Widely publishing the results of the enquiry; 
° Giving users or owners the opportunity to solicit advice from a legal councillor, 
financed by funds provided by investors; 
° Clarify the number and nature of documents to be provided, as well as the steps to be 
followed. 
Concerning environmental impact assessments, solutions are proposed for: 
° Strengthening the economic and social dimensions of EIAs; 
° Improving the process of developing a list of requirements so that operators’ com-
mitments are made more explicit; 
° Coordinating control of the commitments stated in the list of requirements. 
Finally, so as to inform debates between actors and to support new directions of land and 
agricultural policies, it seems important to raise the question of implementing a national 
body to analyze and follow up projects, which would study their actual impacts. 
Conclusions  
This inventory of agribusiness establishments, and the land acquisition dynamics that are 
taking place, permits the drawing up of a first set of lessons learned.  
The establishment of agro-industries and the transfer of lands is a national issue of 
the very first order. This theme deserves particular attention in the framework of 
national debates. The highest State offices must tackle it to define multi-sector develop-
ment policy directions that are favorable to investment, while guaranteeing protection of 
the rights and interests of local populations. Making legal texts and their institutional 
articulation coherent is a priority to ensure an equitable sharing of advantages between 
communities, local governments, the State administration, and investors. 
 Opacity does not pay. It is in investors’ interests to engage in genuinely transparent 
negotiations with the populations concerned; secrecy guarantees the failure of projects 
before they even begin. 
The anticipated momentum of land acquisitions has not materialized. Less than 1% 
of the land identified between 2005 and 2009 by 52 agribusiness projects counted by this 
study is currently being cultivated. The political crisis that Madagascar is experiencing is 
one of the main explanatory factors for the cancelation of numerous projects, particularly 
because of banks’ unfavorable risk assessments for the financing of agribusiness projects. 
The power of the media in orchestrating social protest has been another determining 
factor. From now on, any company that intends to limit risks to its reputation will have to 
take into account, from the outset of any new investment project, civil society’s ability to 
react, the efficiency of its international intermediaries, and the communication opportun-
ities offered by the Internet. The globalization of strategies to control land has been 
accompanied by a globalization of protests against them. 
Is there really “cultivable land" without rights and infinitely available? Some 
statistics indicate that 95% of arable land in Madagascar is currently unexploited. On the 
ground, the reality seems quite different and “uncultivated arable lands” are in demand to 
the extent that investors find themselves in competition over the same land. In the 
debates to come, it would be appropriate to revisit the notion of “arable land”, while 
recalling that in the Malagasy countryside land is rarely without rights. 
Strategies are needed to strengthen local communities’ rights. The roles of the State, 
NGOs, and civil society still seem very weak, even absent, when it comes to protecting 
communities and strengthening their negotiation capacities. Access to information is 
severely lacking at the level of the population, which does not have legal assistance to 
negotiate employment contracts, establish lease contracts, or protect their vital spaces 
(water resources, pasture land, family farms, wood fuel reserves, etc.). Lessons concerning 
“win-win” contracts that allow inclusion of populations in decision-making can be drawn 
from other African countries. 
This study should be considered as the first step in a longer process necessary for the 
conception of a regulatory framework for agribusiness investments. This framework is 
one element of a rural development policy and must favor investments that integrate 
family agriculture. The next steps proposed to follow this study could be organized in a 
process comprising three phases:  
i. Information about strategies to establish agribusinesses and the conception of a 
regulatory framework for investments; 
ii. Debating and defining directions; and 
iii. Joint definition of a regulatory framework. 
It is a question of:  
 ° Determining the skills to assemble in an entity to consider and conceptualize a 
regulatory framework for agribusiness investments. The Sustainable Agrofuel Plat-
form, the Land Observatory, the EDBM, ONE, and relevant ministries could be mobi-
lized to establish this national capacity;  
° Continuing to gather information about the current processes of large-scale land 
acquisition and the establishment of agro-industries, to identify Malagasy agribusiness 
models that allow for the establishment of agricultural value chains and, above all, the 
integration of family agriculture; 
° Proposing directions to establish the basic principles of a regulatory framework for 
investments; 
° Encouraging a national debate on the direction of rural policy development, and 
particularly land policy, protecting existing rights, and opening to international capi-
tal. This debate should be opened not only to actors in the sectors concerned but also 
to civil society representatives, in order to complete or revise a national rural devel-
opment policy. 
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Introduction 
National and international public perceptions of land acquisition projects in Madagascar 
have tended to focus only on the Daewoo Logistics project and, to a lesser degree, on 
that of Varun International, without ever really knowing the fine details. Can observers see 
the forest for the trees? On the ground, are there not diverse initiatives? It is difficult to 
answer these questions since no institution, whether public or private, has precise 
information on, or an overall vision of, the scale and methods of land allocation to 
agribusinesses in Madagascar.  
With ILC’s support, the Land Observatory, the National Land Program of Madagascar, and 
CIRAD have tried to address this lack of data by conducting a study that aims to:  
° Understand the details of the Daewoo Logistics and Varun International projects, 
which have now been canceled; 
° Establish an inventory of land investment projects, by differentiating projects that 
have been announced from those that have been effectively implemented;  
° Better understand operators’ strategies regarding land and specify the status of their 
applications to access land;  
° Present the legal framework that is meant to regulate these investments; 
° Analyze operators’ practices for accessing land, well as the formal and informal 
regulatory methods for these investments at local and national levels; 
° Raise core questions to learn from in the framework of a debate regarding these 
investments and the institutional bodies that need to be strengthened to improve 
the transparency of land acquisition projects, clarify the procedures for investors to 
follow, and limit their negative social, economic, and environmental impacts. 
The goal of the present study, therefore, is to produce information about the ongoing 
processes involved in establishing agribusinesses, in order to draw lessons that will 
support Malagasy public authorities in the conception of a collaborative and transparent 
regulatory framework. 
The study concerns investment projects in the farming sector aiming to produce food 
commodities, agrofuels, or timber. It focuses on projects promoted by private operators, 
foreign or Malagasy, who are planning large-scale farming on land areas of more than 
1,000 hectares, or contract farming (pre-agreed supply agreements between buyers and 
farmers), or management contracts (lease or tenancy contracts) with local farmers. It 
focuses only on projects announced since 2005. Agricultural or agri-food processing 
enterprises based on large-scale production or on contractual arrangements which have 
existed for more than five years have not been studied.  
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From a methodological point of view, data supplied by articles and studies on large-scale 
land acquisitions (Üllenberg 2008 and 2010) have been further developed and com-
pleted through numerous interviews with representatives of public institutions and 
regional or local governments, and with private operators, populations, and key individu-
als. Interviews were conducted in the capital city, Antananarivo, and in two regions 
targeted by investors (Boeny, Sofia). Significant efforts were made to cross-check informa-
tion and field observations, so that the presentation of the current processes would be as 
complete and as realistic as possible, without aspiring to be exhaustive. 
Daewoo and Varun: “lose-lose” 
agribusiness set-ups  
In November 2008, Madagascar was propelled onto the front pages of the international 
media following information published by the Financial Times (Blas 2008), which reported 
that the South Korean company Daewoo Logistics was involved in negotiations with the 
Malagasy government to acquire 1.3 million hectares of arable land in four coastal 
regions of the country. This large-scale project was immediately denounced by oppo-
nents of President Ravalomanana’s regime, who accused it of disposing of the national 
heritage to foreigners. This charge was reinforced by reports in another newspaper, Le 
Monde, (Hervieu 2009) regarding another agribusiness project led by Indian company 
Varun International in the region of Sofia, which involved more than 200,000 hectares. 
The protests were partially orchestrated by international intermediaries, who mobilized 
public opinion in Western countries. In Madagascar, this support added weight to 
national demands and contributed to the fall of the government in March 2009. These 
two agribusiness projects have since been suspended and their main promoters have left 
the country.  
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Objectives and content of the 
Daewoo and Varun projects 
These projects from emerging countries both involved the production of agricultural 
commodities for export. Daewoo intended to produce 500,000 tons of palm oil in the 
eastern parts of Madagascar and 4 million tons of corn in the western parts, most of 
which would be exported to the Korean market. Varun International planned to establish 
13 irrigation schemes within a period of two years, in order to produce 2.8 million tons of 
rice2 and 400,000 tons of corn from the fourth year onwards. Of this production, 20% of 
the rice and 50% of the corn would have been exported. Varun International was hoping 
for a spectacular increase in the productivity of rice paddy, up to 10–12 tons per hectare,3 
thanks to mechanization and systematic intensification. A return on investment was 
expected from the third year. 
The companies announced significant investments: Daewoo intended to mobilize about 
USD 6 billion over 25 years and Varun announced an initial investment of USD 1.17 billion 
over three years. The list of infrastructure to be developed by Daewoo was impressive: 
1,170 schools, 170 private hospitals, 250 markets, 120 churches, 60 power plants, eight 
airports, 30 factories and silos, eight ports, among other projects. Varun’s commitments 
were no less impressive: the construction of health facilities, schools, and electricity and 
drinking water systems was announced, though not quantified. The creation of numer-
ous jobs –70,000 by Daewoo and 1,500 by Varun International – was announced, as well 
as detailed projects, which more or less involved the construction of new towns. 
These very large-scale projects were presented as tools in support of the struggle against 
poverty. However, their implementation required large land areas to be made available, 
which would be partially acquired from lands already subject to rights, if not already 
cultivated. 
  
                                                                  
2 Equivalent to half of Madagascar’s annual rice production. 
3 The average yield of paddy in Madagascar does not exceed 2.5 tons/hectare. 
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Implementation process, land 
negotiations, and agrarian contracts 
Both companies followed similar routes to establish their operations. Already involved in 
the mining sector in Madagascar, they hoped to extend their activities to the agricultural 
sector. They held negotiations at the highest State levels to obtain the land they needed 
for their large-scale mechanized agricultural projects. Negotiations were sequential, first 
with the Presidency, then with the relevant ministries and regions, and finally with 
"persons in charge" of the local population, generally through subcontractors, whose 
“representativeness” was open to question.  
The case of Varun was revealing. On occupied land, implementation of the contract 
farming planned by the company would have been delicate. Its contracts were not 
agreed with individual farmers but with 13 associations, formed specifically for this 
purpose and represented by their presidents. These representatives claimed to have the 
authority to lease land to Varun for crops on 171,000 hectares. They made commitments 
not only for their own land but also for the lands of their descendants and the "full rights 
holders" members of the association, for leases lasting 50 years. However, life expectancy 
in Madagascar is lower than 60 years, so these contracts were akin to life-long transfers of 
their land.  
The contracts anticipated that the 13 associations would authorize Varun to occupy the 
lands, do all the agricultural work, and sell the produce. They also specified that the lands 
granted would not be subject to any claim, demand, or conflict. Landowners were 
required to agree to a confidentiality clause, and were bound not to interfere in the 
company’s agricultural work. Distribution of the envisaged production was unfair: 70% 
would go to Varun and 30% to the landowners; 70% would be sold to Varun at a price 
fixed by the company (see Figure 1). 
The planned sharecropping contracts risked causing more poverty and exclusion, 
because the expected returns seemed unrealistic. According to the terms of the contract, 
even with an illusory production rate of 10 tons of rice per hectare of paddy, a peasant 
family consisting of five persons with one hectare of land would have to anticipate an 
annual rent of three tons of rice, of which 900 kilograms in kind, equaling 585 kilograms 
of white rice. As a family of this size consumes approximately 700 kilograms of white rice 
per year, they would have to buy rice to meet their needs, in a market controlled by 
Varun. 
This also raises the question of whether these peasant families would have their activities 
converted freely or by force into a system of landlord/farm workers recruited by Varun. 
Would they have been able to maintain some agricultural activities of their own if Varun 
had used the land for half a century? Would they have had to migrate to new areas, 
probably by cultivating the last land reserves available, such as forests? Would they have 
moved, without any qualifications, towards cities where the meager industrial and service 
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sectors offer few jobs? In the hasty set-up process of the project, these fundamental 
questions were not asked and the conclusions of consultations regarding rural develop-
ment in the region of Sofia were ignored. As for the "increase in farmers’ incomes" 
announced by Varun, this seemed debatable, to say the least. 
Figure 1: Terms of the contract planned by Varun 
 
 
The political crisis put an end to this project. The day after the contractual farming 
agreements were signed, January 27, 2009, riots erupted in Antananarivo; this marked the 
beginning of the political transition. The project will not now be pursued. A number of 
government statements have confirmed the decision to suspend all land acquisition 
projects, even if no legal arrangements have emerged since then to formalize these 
intentions. 
The failures of the Varun project and especially of the Daewoo project were largely a 
consequence of the political protests of 2008–2009 (Teyssier et al. 2010). The idea of a 
transfer of the tanindrazana, the "land of the ancestors", especially to foreign companies, 
provoked shockwaves in national public opinion. Criticism of these land transfer projects 
was orchestrated in fact by a small number of people: information was gathered from the 
regions involved on Daewoo’s preparatory work, was then widely broadcast from January 
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2009 on the Internet, and then taken up by most of the international media. The Malaga-
sy diaspora, particularly the Collective of Malagasy Land Defense Collective4 – an organi-
zation set up in response to the situation, in connection with the watch on land appropr-
iations organized by various activist organizations5 – played a major role in raising the 
profile of the protests. This media buzz then returned to Madagascar and opposition 
forces were able to use this sensitive issue to mobilize the masses.  
What lessons can be learned? 
The cases of Daewoo and Varun contain the ingredients of an agribusiness set-up 
destined to fail. These elements of a "lose-lose" strategy can be summarized in three 
points: 
A top-down approach 
In both cases, the time spent in negotiations with the central authorities was significantly 
greater than the time allocated for discussions with local populations. Varun took more 
than a year to reach agreements with the Malagasy State and the region of Sofia, but 
envisaged only a 15-day mission, which was assigned to an engineering consulting firm, 
to negotiate contractual farming arrangements with the 13 farmers’ organizations 
established for this purpose. Daewoo signed a prospecting contract with the Malagasy 
State in July 2008, containing specific clauses of confidentiality, to identify the land it 
required with the utmost discretion. 
A lack of interest in local land negotiations 
Intermediaries, with varying competencies, were recruited to negotiate contractual 
farming arrangements with producers. Daewoo recruited surveying teams tasked with 
locating land and plots, without planning for genuine dialogue with local populations. 
Varun hired a subcontractor to create 13 peasant organizations and to get their repre-
sentatives to sign contracts with the other family farmers on a total area of 171,000 
hectares in a period of just 15 days, which confirms its lack of consideration for the local 
people. To ask the 13 new leaders of farmers’ organizations to make a commitment to 
give up lands for 50 years in the names of the other villagers and their children was a 
hugely naïve project. Even with the support of the highest authorities, it was clear that 
the implementation of such a project could not be successful. 
                                                                  
4 http://terresmalgaches.info/. The Collective launched a petition from January 2009 against “the Daewoo 
affair”. 
5 Among the most widely known are: http://farmlandgrab.org/, http://www.grain.org/, 
http://www.viacampesina.org/fr/ 
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Inequitable farming contracts 
The terms of the farming contracts proposed by Varun were highly inequitable and were 
likely to generate poverty. As could be observed in other rural regions, social protests 
would have emerged in various ways: occupations of land, burning of crops, etc.  
The feasibility of both projects was thus at the least uncertain, unless strong pressures 
were exerted on local populations. All the stakeholders – public authorities, investors, 
local authorities, etc. – wasted a lot of energy and money in the preparation of these 
unlikely operations, which would only have traumatized the inhabitants of the Malagasy 
countryside in the long term.  
The following section examines other agribusiness investments and other attempts at 
land appropriation. 
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1 Status of agricultural 
investment projects 
Of more than 50 projects announced 
to date, 30% have stopped and only 
25% are ongoing  
Besides the highly publicized cases of Daewoo and Varun, Madagascar has been the 
focus of numerous other investment projects (Üllenberg 2010). Since 2005, at least 52 
agricultural projects promoted by foreign and Malagasy investors have been announced 
(though this is not an exhaustive inventory). However, of these only 13 are still currently 
ongoing (see Table 1).  
Of all the projects announced, 30% have been canceled or 
have stopped their activity 
There are many reasons for projects being abandoned. The first is associated with the 
strong social and political opposition provoked by the Daewoo project. Demonstrations 
against this project, which lacked transparency and was of such a large scale that the 
rights of local populations risked being affected, led to its cancelation (Teyssier et al. 
2010). Confronted by this mobilization and by the position of the new government, some 
investors and their financiers judged the country’s political and social climate to be 
unsuitable for investment and canceled their projects. Their doubts were particularly 
linked to the possibility of accessing land and securing their investment.  
Other investors re-examined their projects because of financing problems linked to the 
global financial crisis or to uncertainty regarding the project’s economic viability in a 
context of strong fluctuations in world prices (food commodities, petrol).  
Finally, some projects were abandoned because of their technical or managerial fragility. 
Varun’s project was halted largely because the social engineering was insufficient. The 
contracts for land access, which contained unrealistic clauses, were hastily signed with 13 
nominees – appointed by intermediaries – who were supposed to represent thousands 
of individual farmers (Teyssier et al. 2010). 
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Table 1: Number and status of agricultural investment projects by sector 
Sector Announced Ongoing Stopped In preparation  No information 
Agro-food processing 10 2 5 1  2 
Agrofuels           
  – Sugarcane 14 1 2 9 2 
  – Jatropha 20 8 4 5 3 
  – Palm oil 2 0 2 0   
Forestry 5 1 2  0 2 
Other 1 1 0  0   
TOTAL 52 13 15 15 9 
 
Only 25% are ongoing 
The projects that are continuing are only in their initial phases of development – for the 
most part, in the process of gaining access to land. 
30% are in the preparation phase 
Despite the cancelation of numerous projects, the investment dynamics in the agricul-
tural sector have not been totally disrupted. However, they are changing in their nature: 
investors are now primarily Malagasy nationals who envisage smaller-scale projects (11 of 
the 16 projects in the preparation phase). Foreign investors are waiting for political 
stability to actively re-engage in their projects.  
Finally, little information is available on the remaining 15% of projects. No indication 
could be gathered on their future: whether these investments will be maintained or not, 
or what level of progress they have made. 
The majority of projects are 
targeting agrofuel production 
Based on the project announcements counted since 2005, three main sectors are being 
targeted:  
° Production of food commodities (cereals, crops, beef); 
° Agrofuel production from jatropha, sugar cane and, to a lesser extent, palm oil trees; 
° Development of industrial forest plantations to produce resin or wood, or reforesta-
tion for carbon sequestration.  
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At present, the ongoing projects are mainly oriented towards agrofuel production, 
particularly from jatropha. In Madagascar, the engine of investment is not the securing of 
foodstuffs, as the media have announced on the basis of Asian investors. The main 
motive for investors is to generate profits by producing agrofuels. 
Figure 2: Projects announced and ongoing, according to anticipated production 
objectives  
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Targeted land areas vs. areas in use: 
the great divide 
Based on the projects announced to date, about three million hectares of land have been 
targeted to grow annual or perennial crops, mostly for production of foodstuffs (and for a 
livestock project on 200,000 hectares – Üllenberg 2010): see Maps 1–2 and Figure 3.  
The area targeted by the current projects represents no more than 150,000 hectares, 20 
times less what was initially announced (see Map 1), with most of this intended for 
jatropha production. 
Because of its soil quality, favorable rainfall for crop production, the presence of vast, 
relatively flat tracts, and especially because of its proximity of the sea in order to ship 
products, land in the coastal regions is subject to the most applications by investors. 
Since 2005, the majority of applications have concerned the regions of Boeny, Sofia, 
Melaky, Menabe, Atsinanana, SAVA, and Atsimo-Andrefana.  
The targeted land areas – three million hectares in total, including 1.3 million hectares for 
the Daewoo project – are in contrast with the two million hectares cultivated by 2.5 
million family farms. Estimates of the total area of arable land in Madagascar vary depend-
ing on institutions and methodologies – eight million hectares of land in total according 
to the Ministry of Agriculture (2008) and 15–20 million hectares according to the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2007). Based on these estimates, the land 
targeted represents 37% of total arable land reserves in the first case, and 15–20% in the 
second.  
These data explain why both government and other organizations have become 
involved in the debate on private investment in the agricultural sector. The fact that 
"only" 150,000 hectares are currently being targeted slightly takes the sting out of 
debates about the risks of land acquisition by agribusiness, but does not resolve them 
altogether. To target such a proportion of arable land reserves, in the space of just five 
years, raises serious questions about development planning and how family farming and 
agribusiness can be reconciled.  
Madagascar should capitalize on the current decline in applications from investors (or a 
break in the acquisition of lands?) to engage in deeper reflection on the position to be 
adopted in the face of investment, and on the terms to be established to direct it: land 
occupation, production (crops, production organization modes, targeted markets). 
Furthermore, the notion of arable land must be discussed in terms of the practices and 
realities of the Malagasy context. 
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Map 1: Targeted land areas announced, ongoing, and currently being exploited, by region 
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Map 2: Division of land areas initially targeted, by type of crop 
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Figure 3: Distribution of land areas targeted: projects announced and ongoing  
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Behind the headline figures, the projects differ in terms of land holdings: 
° In the agri-food sector, besides large-scale projects (Daewoo, Varun) that planned the 
development of areas of 200,000 to one million hectares, a number of smaller-scale 
projects (of between 200 and 1,000 hectares) were also planned. At the moment, only 
two projects are in progress. The most significant covers only 1,000 hectares and 
eventually aims to cultivate 5,000 hectares.  
° In the agrofuels sector, the jatropha projects announced involved land areas of 300 to 
120,000 hectares. The majority, particularly those that are ongoing, hope to obtain 
areas comprising between 10,000 and 30,000 hectares. The projects in the prepara-
tory phase, some undertaken by Malagasy nationals, do not exceed 2,000 hectares 
(only one sugar cane project is targeting approximately 25,000 hectares).  
° The forestry sector, for the few projects on which information is available, also 
envisages plantations of 10,000 to 30,000 hectares.  
The nature of the land targeted varies significantly according to the type of production. 
While projects based on food production or on sugar cane look for good-quality, arable 
soils, projects based on jatropha or forest plantations seek lower-quality lands situated on 
plateaus. These various orientations can raise problems of competing usages. Family 
farms generally use shoal lands (tanimbary, baiboho), those most in demand, for food 
crop production. Plateau lands (tanety), on the other hand, are reserved for breeding 
livestock and for tree plantations, and are used according to the location. 
Currently, the land areas actually cultivated amount only to 22,000 hectares and 
represent less than 1% of the areas initially announced and 15% of the land area 
involved in ongoing projects (see Figure 3).  
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Foreign and national operators 
The case of Madagascar involves investors from a variety of backgrounds. More than 
two-thirds of project promoters between 2005 and 2010 were foreign (36 out of 52 
projects). Of these, half were European (from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands), and the rest were from South Africa, India, Australia, and South 
Korea. The attraction of Madagascar to foreign investors seems to be linked to the 
government’s efforts to create a favorable investment climate, a challenge resulting from 
an evaluation by the World Bank in 2005 of the investment climate in six countries 
including China, Madagascar, and four other African countries. This evaluation revealed a 
considerable decline in FDI (foreign direct investment),6 and ranked Madagascar 146th out 
of 177 countries worldwide. 
Subsequently the country’s economic recovery strategies were focused, inter alia, on the 
promotion of foreign investment through the creation of the Economic Development 
Board of Madagascar (EDBM) in 2006; the development of the MAP (Madagascar Action 
Plan) in 2007,7 which clearly set out among its immediate priorities an increase in 
investment, particularly through the authorization of land acquisitions for non-national 
investors; and the adoption of an investment law in 2008. 
Malagasy operators tend to concentrate on the agrofuels sector and are aiming mainly to 
develop the sugar cane value chain for ethanol production (see Figure 4). 
In Madagascar, the remaining project promoters – foreign or Malagasy – are for the most 
part small or medium-sized private companies. Whereas the promoters of agri-food 
processing and forestry projects are highly experienced in the agricultural sector, the 
promoters of agrofuel projects are generally inexperienced in this sector (see Figure 4). 
  
                                                                  
6 FDI was estimated at USD 262 million in 2003, USD 256 million in 2004, and USD 250 million in 2006. Source: 
Banque Centrale de Madagascar – INSTAT. Compilation 2008. Etudes annuelles sur les Investissements Directs 
Etrangers et de portefeuilles à Madagascar.    
7 Immediate priorities of MAP/Reform 2: significantly increasing investment in favor of growth. In Madagascar 
Action Plan 2007, p.16.  
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Figure 4: Number of projects by type of investor and type of production  
 
 
The few agreements concluded between foreign and Malagasy operators involve access 
to land.8 These land arrangements involve plots covering less than 500 hectares, with the 
immediate objective of developing tree nurseries or conducting trials. In one case, the 
foreign operator is associated with a Malagasy partner, who has undertaken the land 
lease applications under his own name for an area of about 20,000 hectares. The en-
gagement of the latter in the management of the project cannot reduce him to a “front 
man”, but nor does it seem to give him the status of a full partner or shareholder in the 
company. 
  
                                                                  
8 It seems that, among the ongoing projects or those in the start-up phase, there are few economic partner-
ships in which Malagasies are shareholders of a company launched by foreigners, but this issue warrants 
deeper analysis.  
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Plans for large-scale agricultural 
production  
Two main organizational frameworks for production have been retained by the remain-
ing projects: large-scale farming and contract farming (i.e. the delegation of production 
via contracts with farmers).  
For food or forestry production, large-scale farming or plantations – mechanized to a 
certain degree – are preferred. Although family farms are familiar with and produce most 
of the crops or trees envisaged, barely any of the projects are intending to imple-
ment contracts.  
In the agrofuels sector, the situation is different. Although the plan for large-scale 
farming has been maintained for most of the jatropha projects, the leaders of 
ethanol projects have chosen to use sugar cane and to grow it in rural areas. 
Indeed, the investors are Malagasy and are close to the sugar cane producers’ network, if 
not member themselves. Their objective is to propose more profitable outlets to local 
producers than those offered by sugar factories in unstable economic conditions. Some 
jatropha projects, promoting objectives of sustainable local development, also envisage 
the development of contract farming. 
Figure 5: Number of projects by production plan and by announced objective of 
production  
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chances of generating a profit margin depend on the capacity of the plants and on the 
exporters’ requirements in terms of quality). 
Export-oriented projects  
Exportation is the common point among the projects. For food commodities, the 
targeted markets are, with a few exceptions (e.g. Varun), the investing countries’ own 
markets. For agrofuels, Europe is the main target market, in anticipation of EU quotas for 
the use of biofuels in conventional fuels, and also because of networks maintained by 
investors in their country of origin.  
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2 Operators’ land strategies 
A general preference for renting 
rather than purchasing land  
The investors’ first objective is to access land. For projects based on large-scale planta-
tions (jatropha), for both foreigners and national investors, the vast majority of operators 
are seeking a land lease. According to investors, this preference for leasing arises from a 
desire to limit initial capital costs, to avoid tying up capital, and the risks of social protest. 
A lease also allows them, in the event of technical, economic, or political problems to halt 
the project at a lower cost. Only a group of Malagasy investors wants to buy large areas of 
land. 
For projects based on farmers’ inputs (sugar cane and jatropha), an operator’s need for 
land is limited. They generally limit themselves to small areas to set up tree nurseries and 
to build storage facilities or factories. In this case, Malagasy entrepreneurs will undertake 
an application for registration or try to buy the land. 
Selection criteria for land 
Investors are looking for land with common characteristics:  
° Good pedo-climatic conditions:9 the most sought-after land generally has a flat 
surface area allowing for mechanization, located in regions that receive significant 
rainfall but at the same time are sheltered from cyclones. The ongoing jatropha pro-
jects require tanety lands (hilltops and plateaus) and not shoal lands suitable for the 
production of irrigated rice; 
° Available unowned land that is locally under- or unused, or unoccupied;  
° Low-cost access: proximity to a main road for the transportation of raw materials and 
inputs, as well as proximity to a sea (or river) port for the shipping of raw materials or 
finished products. Large economic operators, such as Daewoo and Varun, are not 
limited by accessibility constraints. The Daewoo project, for example, planned for the 
construction of roads, bridges, and ports.  
Competition between operators: a 
sign of scarcity of land suitable for 
agro-industry? 
                                                                  
9 That is, pertaining to soil and climate. 
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Contrary to all expectations regarding the scale of Madagascar’s territory and its signifi-
cant tanety areas, operators have found themselves competing for access to the same 
land. Such situations do not seem to be isolated. Of the seven current jatropha projects, 
three have involved competitive situations:  
° In Sofia, competition emerged between three operators for 30,000 hectares of land in 
a plain zone that is directly accessible via the sea. Each of the operators had identified 
this land through different procedures (identification of the land by a Malagasy part-
ner, advice from the regional services, or identification based on maps and aerial iden-
tification). Only two submitted their lease applications to the State-owned Land Ser-
vices; 
° In Boeny, two operators targeted an area of 10,000 hectares along the national 
highway, although only one persevered; 
° Again in Boeny, two operators developed projects in the same rural area; they tried to 
agree on areas that they could respectively develop.  
These competitive situations prove the fact that, at present, there is not much land that 
meets favorable investment criteria. Estimates of millions of hectares of potential arable 
land based on pedo-climatic criteria have turned out to be based on only partial informa-
tion. The majority of investors are certainly looking for arable land but, more specifically, 
for flat and accessible land at a reduced cost.  
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No lease contracts signed 
For the majority of the foreign operators involved, lease applications are in progress.10 
Most initiated their applications more than two years ago, but have yet to obtain their 
lease contracts. Assembly of a lease application demands a significant time investment by 
entrepreneurs. The length of this process is explained by: 
° Technical difficulties encountered on the ground in examining plots of 10,000–30,000 
hectares;  
° The practices of certain agents who only handle the case in exchange for monetary 
compensation; 
° Competition among operators; 
° Problems of the targeted land encroaching on titled land or on land claimed by local 
people;  
° Local social reactions to protect lands already in use (see below); and 
° Above all, the current political situation: on the one hand, investors do not want to 
submit their case to be signed out of fear that a future government might question 
their contract, and, on the other hand, the current authorities do not want to sign 
contracts as long as the question of large land acquisitions remains socially controver-
sial. According to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and Decentralization, 
the government has not signed any lease contracts concerning State-owned land.  
So as not to delay the progress of their projects and to begin agronomic trials, operators 
have established their first plantations (tree nurseries or initial plots) on land rented 
informally, thanks to agreements with private Malagasy owners, mayors, or the main 
representatives of regional governments (for example, the Land Mark project). 
Without a lease contract or formal confirmation of a future contract, operators have 
difficulty in securing financing, as banks require land guarantees before granting credit. 
Thus operators find themselves in a difficult situation: they have incurred expenses over a 
period of two years to finance the various procedures and initiate agricultural work, but 
have no guarantee that they will obtain credit. This situation has contributed to some 
investors canceling their projects.  
Only two projects, which have now been halted, would have obtained their first lease 
commitments within two years, as their applications concerned land already registered in 
the name of a public institution. The Flora Eco Power Company, comprising Norwegian 
and Israeli shareholders, had obtained through the main representative of the Boeny 
regional government a 3,500-hectare lease on lands titled in the name of the Ministry of 
Water and Forests. In exchange for granting the lease, the region required the operator to 
construct additional buildings for a prison in the area and to provide agricultural training 
                                                                  
10 Generally, initial plans have been realized and procedures of identifying land are either yet to be done or are 
ongoing (among them Delta Petroli, Bio Energy Limited, Fuel Stock, Sopremad). 
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courses for the prisoners. Only 600 hectares were planted, but the operation was stopped 
because of a lack of financing. 
In addition, the GEM project managed to negotiate land access without going through 
the State-Owned Land Administration. The actors have already planted more than 30,000 
hectares of jatropha on various plots, the largest being 7,000 hectares (through the 
plantations’ success rates are very varied). Land access was negotiated within the space of 
one year with the mayors of the local government and with the approval of the former 
main representative of the regional government, even on State-owned land. The opera-
tor negotiated that the rent, of USD 1 per hectare, would be paid to the local government 
involved once the jatropha plantations had entered production. 
For most of the Malagasy operators, applications for acquisition have been issued. 
Because the areas in question are limited, these cases are handled only by the decentra-
lized State-Owned Land Administration, and their validation is less controversial. At 
present, operators have obtained title deeds (temporary or permanent) to plots of less 
than 50 hectares in size (1–3 plots per operator).  
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3 The legal and institutional 
framework for investments 
in the agricultural sector 
The role of public authorities, 
according to current law 
Three bodies of legal texts currently regulate the establishment of operators in Madagas-
car. These are the Investment Law, the new land legislation, and the State’s Decree on the 
Compatibility of Investment with the Environment (MECIE). Implementation of these rests 
with three groups of institutions, respectively the Economic Development Board of 
Madagascar (EDBM), State-Owned Land Administration and local land offices, and the 
National Office for the Environment (ONE).  
The establishment of a one-stop service provider for 
operators according to the Investment Law 
One of the central points of the Investment Law (N° 2007-036 of January 14, 2008) is to 
establish a single office to receive and direct investors: the Economic Development Board 
of Madagascar (EDBM). The functioning of this institution was guaranteed until 2009 by 
international donor funds (from the World Bank). Its main objectives are to:  
° Contribute to the development of an incentive framework for foreign and national 
investors (taxes, customs, duties);  
° Simplify certain administrative procedures: creation of companies, obtaining visas, 
authorization to set up “tax-free zones”, registration in the commercial registry;  
° Facilitate land acquisitions by foreign operators who have already created a Malagasy 
legal entity,11 by issuing the authorization for land acquisitions;  
° Mediate in possible disputes between companies or between companies and the 
State. 
Investors must pay two types of tax. Land taxes (IFT) are paid to the local government 
where the plantation is located (in Amboromalandy, for example, the mayor announced 
that land taxes would be USD 1 per hectare per year for cultivated land). Then, as a 
company, the operator must pay income tax (IR) or tax on net profits. The latter is paid at 
the regional level, where the company is registered on the commercial registry. In 
                                                                  
11 In practice, the only constraint is that one of the associates must be registered as a resident. 
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addition, the investor must, if it transports unprocessed farm products for commercial 
purposes, pay taxes to the local government where the production has taken place.  
New land laws aiming to secure the population’s land 
rights and to regulate investors’ access to land  
Since 2005, Madagascar has been engaged in a land reform process based on the 
modernization of land services and the decentralization of most land resources towards 
local authorities, so as to strengthen land security.  
The recognition of local land rights  
The major change imposed by the 2005 Land Law was the shift from the presumption of 
State ownership to the presumption of private property. State-owned land has thus been 
restricted to land titled in the name of public institutions and to land without occupants 
(Figure 6).  
Now land that is untitled but occupied is no longer State-owned. Land claimed by local 
people acquires the status of “untitled private property” and is the administrative respon-
sibility of the local government. According to this law, users able to prove individual (or 
collective) holding of land can obtain a land certificate of similar legal value to that of a 
title. This certificate is issued by a local land office at the conclusion of a local, public – 
and somewhat contradictory – process. Thanks to these procedures, users can secure 
their land rights. 
In April 2010, a network of 350 local land offices was created, and these have since issued 
52,000 land certificates. Considering that land reform began only four years ago, these 
figures provide evidence of significant progress in recognizing users’ rights. However, the 
local land offices do not cover the whole Malagasy territory (which encompasses 1,550 
local governments), nor do they cover at the local level all of the lands used by the local 
population, taking into consideration the status of certain lands that remain State-owned 
and beyond the jurisdiction of local governments. 
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Figure 6: Status of land in Madagascar following the Land Law of October 17, 2005  
 
Source: National Land Program  
Entrepreneurs’ methods of accessing land  
The leasing or purchase of land can be done through: 
° Land owners in possession of a title or certificate (concerning titled private property 
or certified untitled private property);  
° The State on state-owned land (land titled in the name of the State or without 
occupants). The purchase of land, which is possible only for Malagasy individuals or 
Malagasy legal entities, implies that the buyer registers the land in his name. A lease, 
for between 18 and 99 years, can be directly established if the targeted land is already 
registered in the name of the State, and at the lessee’s expense if this land is genu-
inely unoccupied in its most basic sense of “vacant and without master”;  
° In theory, transactions can also involve zones with special status. The previous 
government planned to create land reserves qualified as “Agricultural Investment 
Zones” (AIZs) in the case of the agricultural sector. These zones would allow the 
quicker establishment of leases, and even sales to investors meeting the selection 
criteria (i.e. intensive and market-oriented agriculture). However, the law concerning 
the definition and development of lands with special status was not promulgated. 
For areas of less than 50 hectares, applications for lease or acquisition must be made to 
the regional State-Owned Land Administration . Above this limit, applications are passed 
on to the central State-Owned Land Administration and become the responsibility of the 
Minister in charge of land administration – the Ministry of Town and Country Planning 
and Decentralization (Law 2008-014 on State-owned land). 
The authorization of land acquisitions issued by the EDBM is supposed to facilitate land 
access for foreigners, provided that they create a Malagasy legal entity. Its objective is to 
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allow foreign investors the right to registration and acquisition equivalent to that of 
Malagasy operators. As the corresponding decree concerning application was not 
adopted, a level of ambiguity persists concerning the actual function of this authoriza-
tion, as well as the division of roles between the EDBM and the State-Owned Land 
Administration. In the agricultural sector, no investors have yer applied for this authoriza-
tion. 
Requirement to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment  
The MECIE Decree on Compatibility of Investments with the Environment (Decree No 99-
954 of December 15, 1999, modified by Decree No 2004-167) states the measures to 
which every operator should conform in order to reduce ecological, social, and economic 
risks associated with the establishment of projects. ONE, in association with the environ-
mental units of various ministries, oversees the application and follow-up of this Decree.  
For every agricultural project involving an area of 1,000 hectares or more, the Decree 
obliges the operator to undertake an environmental impact assessment (EIA). This 
assessment integrates the analysis of all the environmental as well as social and econom-
ic impacts of the project. It also includes consultations with local-level authorities and the 
local population, in the presence of an evaluation commission comprising a project 
manager from ONE and representatives from the relevant ministries. ONE validates the 
assessment, which concludes with the issuing of a license and the establishment of a list 
of requirements. The evaluation commission regulates adherence to the list of require-
ments. 
Obligatory steps for investors  
The documents mentioned above oblige the investor to pass through three institutions, 
which are, in order:  
1. The EDBM (which is supposed to be the investor’s only access point) for (if necessary) 
the creation of a Malagasy legal entity, for obtaining visas, and for registering in the 
commercial registry;  
2. The State-Owned Land Administration to apply for the registration of land or a lease 
for land; 
3. ONE for the completion of the environmental impact assessment and the issuance of 
an environmental license, associated with a specific list of requirements. 
These steps are meant to indicate the path an investor must take. Although none of these 
institutions has the specific competency to select projects, they still have to ensure 
according to legislation that:  
° The operator is registered for and pays taxes;  
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° The population’s land rights (untitled private property, titled private property, specific 
status zones i.e. land reserves, national parks, etc.) are respected and those of investors 
are secured;  
° The project’s harmful environmental impacts are limited;  
° The social and economic conditions offered to local residents or to people employed 
by the projects meet the minimum standards. 
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4 From the legal framework 
to practices on the ground 
Discrepancies between the legal framework and practices on the ground are caused by 
three main factors:  
° Large investments represent a new phenomenon, for which public services, under-
endowed in both material and human resources, are not sufficiently prepared; 
° The laws that directly or indirectly govern investment can be more or less well 
mastered and interpreted differently by public officials, investors, and citizens; 
° While the steps imposed by legislation are generally respected (application for land 
through the State services and the EIA), certain practices can allow not only acceler-
ated handling of cases but also the reduction of certain constraints. 
An analysis of the steps taken by operators and the roles of the institutions with whom 
they interact brings to light differences between documents and practices, and allows 
consideration of the effectiveness of the regulatory methods established by public 
authorities.  
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A one-stop service provider for 
investors that is struggling to 
perform its functions  
Entrepreneurs do not systematically use the EDBM for all of its functions, to receive, 
advise, and guide investors. The EDBM has difficulty in developing an overall vision of 
current projects and does not really direct investors towards the obligatory steps they 
must undertake (State-Owned Land Administration, ONE) or those that are strongly 
advised (regional and local public authorities, local population). Indeed, while most 
foreign investors hire a national expert to assist their process,12 their points of entry and 
their institutional paths are different. 
In their initial phase, the processes followed by foreign operators are mainly top-down: 
from the government or the main representative of the regional government towards 
the local elected representatives.  
The economically most significant operators, particularly those representing large 
multinational companies, directly address members of  the government. Approval by the 
highest representatives of the State allows them to obtain the support of regional-level 
public authorities. Big operators such as Daewoo and Varun have effectively mobilized 
regions and decentralized services, but have invested less time in lower administrative 
levels: their economic strength and their capacity to recruit experts seemingly nullified 
any need to negotiate directly at the local level.  
Some operators have mobilized the EDBM’s services from the beginning. In addition to 
obtaining precise information on national investment conditions, they have looked for 
support to identify land and to make their project known to the government at the same 
time. The EDBM has thus played the role of intermediary, directing them to the relevant 
ministers and regional representatives and, at the same time, accompanying the negotia-
tions.  
Several operators have solicited the main representatives of regional government (chef de 
région), bypassing – or not – the EDBM. They have thus obtained initial political support 
and information on a priori available land. Notably, they have been put in contact with 
                                                                  
12 In the surveying phase, foreign operators generally turn to the services of an intermediary. The expectations 
of these experts generally involve three factors: (i) establishing contact and accompaniment through 
institutional procedures; (ii) advice and information on the legal framework related to the investment and to 
access to land; and (iii) agronomic advice and expertise to identify suitable production areas. Because of the 
newness of these large-scale agricultural projects, few consultants are really in a position to call themselves 
experts. Consultants who position themselves as “jacks of all trades”, typically retired or public officials, are 
generally recruited on account of their networks within the civil service or for their agronomic knowledge. 
Their competencies in specific areas have at times led projects down difficult paths (e.g. wrong choice of 
agronomic area, unfamiliarity with institutional processes). Currently, the intermediary market is evolving and 
is becoming progressively more specialized. Consultants, through their experience with the first projects in 
Madagascar either as managers or agronomists, are emerging and selling their services of knowledge and 
technical support.  
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the mayors of the rural areas involved. The regional level – particularly the chef de région – 
appears to be a point of entry or systematic passage.  
Except for projects promoted by Malagasy operators, mayors are generally informed only 
at the end of the chain, if not bypassed altogether. Investors should nevertheless syste-
matically obtain their agreement – formalized by a signature – to begin the process of 
applying for a lease with the State-Owned Land Administration. Mayors are normally 
supposed to participate in the Commission for State Ownership Recognition, an integral 
part of the land registration procedure. 
As for local populations, they are generally informed by investors only when the neces-
sary procedures for land access (agreement of mayors, acceptance by the CSOR) are 
initiated or during the completion of the EIA, with varying degrees of consultation, 
depending on the case (see below). 
Impact assessments: relevant 
safeguards, uncertain modes of 
control 
Conditional land access based on impact assessments  
An EIA, including environmental, social, and economic aspects, is compulsory for any 
agricultural project with a land holding exceeding or equal to 1,000 hectares. On the 
basis of a guide supplied by ONE, it can be undertaken by the operator or can be 
subcontracted to a research consultancy firm. It is then examined by a Technical Evalua-
tion Committee (TEC), comprised of representatives of the relevant ministries (Agricul-
ture, Water and Forests, Tourism, Mines, Transport, etc.) and representatives from ONE.  
Although the legislation specifies that the EIA must be carried out once the land contract 
(purchase or lease) is acquired, the technical services and ONE insist on the opposite. This 
adaptation demonstrates the will of the technical services to better regulate investment 
dynamics, even if this confuses the order of the steps to be followed by investors. This 
measure, which conditions land access in the EIA, is largely respected. Almost all of the 
investors wanting to develop areas greater than 1,000 hectares have indeed initiated this 
study;13 the only operator who did not carry out an EIA managed to access land through 
informal agreements with the local government.14 
                                                                  
13 At present, operators are in the process of conducting or evaluating this study. Three permits have been 
issued for bioethanol factory projects, but these do not include an agricultural production phase managed 
by the operator.  
14 Follow-up investigations would be necessary to see if this operator, who circumvented the environmental 
legislation, will be summoned by ONE, if not sanctioned by the concerned ministries.  
32 
Although the majority of operators initiate an EIA, questions remain as to whether it is 
comprehensive and whether it is really binding.  
Impact assessments to be strengthened 
The lack of a clear distinction between the project promoter and the entity in charge of 
the EIA, as well as the absence of any obligation to use the services of a certified body, 
raises questions concerning the quality of impact assessments.  
In addition, the EIA is coupled with a reading – but not with any critical analysis – of the 
business plan. Assumptions of the expected agronomic and economic results and 
returns, allowing the actual conditions for realization of the project to be judged, seem to 
be overlooked. Nor are short- and medium-term economic impacts estimated by 
category of beneficiary (population, local or regional government, State).  
The implementation of an EIA obliges the operator to consult the local population and 
authorities. This consultation has the advantage of contributing to the dissemination of 
information and the opening up of a debate at the local level. However, questions remain 
as to the true representativeness of the villagers attending meetings and the effective 
level of consultation. Furthermore, information is not disseminated more widely and thus 
deprives civil society of a minimum level of knowledge, if not the right to monitor the 
current processes. 
A list of requirements that completes the contract 
A list of requirements is produced during the evaluation of the EIA and is annexed to the 
lease contract. This is meant to formalize the environmental, social, and economic 
measures that the operator has agreed to undertake. It thus completes the lease contract, 
which is limited to the land dimension of the arrangement between the State and the 
operator.  
In the rare EIAs concerning the agricultural sector that have been published, environmen-
tal measures are numerous and are clearly described. Social or economic measures are, 
on the other hand, underdeveloped. The consultations held in the region of Sofia for the 
Delta Petroli project provide an example that attests to local people’s ability to react and 
of their social and environmental demands. The regional representative, local mayors, 
and local populations did not hesitate to state their hopes in terms of infrastructural 
development and jobs to the operator. The effective translation of these hopes in the list 
of requirements is less evident, however. The list mentions respect for the usage and 
current modes of management of the targeted lands, and the possibility of the operator 
delegating the development of water and energy access schemes to an NGO, but these 
objectives are neither qualified nor quantified. In the absence of precise details, monitor-
ing and enforcing such commitments is difficult.  
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Social and environmental commitments without real 
controls 
The EIA has the advantage of formalizing environmental and social safeguards, but the 
conditions of respecting and controlling them remain hypothetical. In theory, monitoring 
that is undertaken by the operator must be checked every year by the concerned mayors, 
representatives of ministries, and ONE. Added to the potential difficulties of familiarizing 
all local actors with assessment matrices, drafted in French, the lack of specification on 
the commitments of the operator leads to persistent questions about the effective means 
at the disposal of the relevant authorities (regional and national services of various 
ministries) to carry out controls in a effective and coordinated way.  
Securing land rights: improvements 
to be pursued 
The situation in Madagascar in 2008 appeared somewhat paradoxical. The government 
lauded, on the one hand, the securing of the population’s land rights thanks to new land 
laws, while proposing, on the other, the establishment of foreign investors by agreeing to 
allocate them huge tracts of land; a desire to secure the rights of farmers “from the 
bottom” coincided with a desire to impose the development of very large agricultural 
firms “from the top”. The current government has not yet defined its position on the 
questions of land security and allocation.  
Land security of local occupants and owners 
a. Sources of land insecurity due to entrepreneurs acquiring land  
On the basis of the new legislation, the granting of a lease for land recovered from state-
owned territories can be made on two types of land (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Options and key questions in the transfer of leases for State-owned land 
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In the first case, a lease can be granted for land registered in the name of a public actor. If 
such land is already occupied, the administration considers the activity – crops, pastures, 
or gathering wood for energy purposes – illegal. The users are classified as squatters and 
are not considered eligible for compensation. According to State-Owned Land Adminis-
tration representatives, such a situation could nevertheless lead to agreements, even 
compensation, to avoid the risk of social conflict. For the moment, no cases of lease 
transfer to a private investor on land registered in the name of a public actor are in 
progress. 
In the second case, a lease can be established on unoccupied State-owned land. This 
land must have been previously registered in the name of the State. The lands to be 
registered must not encroach on or include titled private property, special status zones 
(national parks, land reserves), or untitled private property. 
This implies that land comprising these various categories is identified and/or listed 
beforehand. Currently no database exhaustively lists at the local level the various types of 
land and their status, although local land use plans (Plans locals d’occupation foncière 
(PLOF)) should eventually be able to establish this inventory. For the moment: 
° PLOFs are available only from local governments equipped with a local land office 
(one-third of local governments in Madagascar). As land reform is relatively recent, 
much land that is individually or collectively claimed – such as cultivated or wooded 
plots of land, fallow land, village or family land reserves, ancestral lands and pastures – 
is not yet secured by a land certificate and is not demarcated on maps. The PLOFs do 
not contain exhaustive or precise information on the location of titled parcels and 
they are still not used by the State-Owned Land Administration. 
° The topographic maps used by the State-Owned Land Administration are not 
necessarily up-to-date and do not consider land comprising untitled private property.  
The SCOR’s fieldwork compensates, a priori, for the absence of a systematic inventory. 
Comprised of a State-Owned Land Administration agent, a topographer, a mayor, and 
leaders of the fokontany concerned,15 SCOR commissions have to verify on the ground 
that the targeted area does not encroach on land that is already owned. When these 
commissions are actually active, land users and owners are informed and, in cases of 
encroachment, can ask that the boundaries of land targeted by the registration be 
rectified. 
Respect for the existing rights of local owners and users depends entirely on the effective 
realization of this stage of the Commission and the way it is led. However, local resi-
dents/users of targeted lands are not systematically informed either of the planned 
agricultural project or of the coming of the SCOR. They are meant to be represented by 
the leader of the fokontany and the mayor, but the latter does not necessarily know about 
                                                                  
15 Equivalent to a village. 
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new measures to secure untitled private property and can be influenced by the repre-
sentative of the regional government or the operator. Initial observations, however, show 
that populations are reactive. Questions arise concerning the formalization of information 
produced during the SCOR process to rectify the limits of the targeted land and, especial-
ly, about the capacity of the users or owners concerned to assert their interests in the 
event of a dispute 
Exceptionally, when the project is considered to be in the public interest (decree issued 
by the Council of Ministers) and when areas targeted by the lease partially include titled 
or untitled private property, a lease application can lead to expropriations. In this case, 
following the example of projects in the mining sector (see Box 1), the occupants, 
whether they have a title or not, are legally entitled to compensation. Until now, howev-
er, no agricultural project has required such a decree in the public interest.16 
Box 1: Compensation procedures in practice: the example of the mining sector 
The Malagasy government authorized the establishment of the QIT Madagascar 
Minerals (QMM) mining project for the extraction of ilmenite by Rio Tinto in the 
Taolagnaro region, in southeast Madagascar. The large scale of the project required 
the relocation of a number of villages. According to the law and in coherence with 
Operational Policy OP 4.12, which addresses involuntary displacement within the 
framework of World Bank-financed projects, compensation had to be granted to the 
affected persons.  
Although the quarry is located in a sparsely populated forest zone (in the Mandena 
forest, where 6,280 hectares have been affected by the mineral deposit), the con-
struction of the Ehoala industrial/harbor complex, together with a temporary camp 
for workers and a 15 km road  connecting mines with the port, required the reloca-
tion of 530 households along the highway and in the limits of the company’s hold-
ings.  
Implementation of these infrastructure projects required the availability of about 800 
hectares of land; this consisted of State-owned land or private properties (titled or 
untitled). A Declaration of Public Utility (DPU)17 justified the acquisition of land af-
fected by the plan. Since the project was established with the support of the World 
Bank, its operational policy (OP 4.12) concerning involuntary displacement required 
that persons and property should be exposed to the least damage possible during 
                                                                  
16 The Daewoo and Varun projects, if they had not been stopped, could have been considered as priorities and 
could have led to expropriations.  
17 According to Ordinance 62 – 023 of September 16, 1962, a Declaration of Public Utility is made by the 
Council of Ministers. The level and the criteria of projects able to be declared of public utility vary and are not 
clearly specified in the Ordinance (which only cites the types of work).  
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and after its implementation. In addition, this policy calls for the granting of compen-
sation to Persons Affected by the Project (PAPs).  
An Administrative Evaluation Committee (AEC), managed by the main representative 
of the regional government and comprised of representatives from the regional 
services involved (Agriculture, State-Owned Land Administration, etc..), was created 
to estimate the PAPs’ losses and the opportunity costs, and to study the nature and 
amount of the compensation required. Following a commodo-incommodo investiga-
tion, the AEC communicated its decisions on compensation, notably: i) the land 
characteristics (bare land, “waste” lands, or fallow land) should be compensated in 
cash, ii) houses should be compensated in kind – i.e. replaced with new houses, iii) 
agricultural land should be compensated in kind, by other land of equal area if prod-
uctivity was identical and by larger areas if the quality of replacement land was lower, 
and iv) tree plantations should be compensated in kind. 
For fallow, bare, or uncultivated land, the compensation was set at 1,000 Ariary per 
square metre (10 million Ariary per hectare, approximately USD 5,000), while the loss 
of rice fields was compensated at 2,500 Ariary per square metre. For crops other than 
rice, compensation was set at 1,700 Ariary per square metre. 
In addition, monetary compensation was paid for lost crops (for certain fruit trees or 
crops requiring several years after planting to produce, compensation was paid 
annually until the new crops were able to be harvested), as a relocation allowance, 
and as compensation for eviction from State-owned land. By April 2007, the final date 
for compensation, more than 5.3 billion Ariary (USD 2.65 million) had been paid (the 
initial sum of 5.3 million Ariary was increased following users' late claims), and 80 new 
houses (out of 83 planned) had been built and delivered to PAPs. Land included with 
these houses was not titled, contrary to initial announcements. An NGO was re-
cruited for the management of payments and accompaniment of the affected per-
sons. 
Overall, the principles and basic theories of the program of relocation were con-
ceived to assure the legality of the process (commodo-incommodo investigation, 
Declaration of Public Utility, organization of an AEC, creation of a unit in charge of 
receiving and handling of the claims and the complaints) and the distribution of fair 
compensation. All of the listed PAPs who occupied land without formal documents 
or land titles (8% of the land), were listed for compensation and were paid according 
to the nature of their plots (the owners of titled land benefited from a 10% increase 
compared with “informal” occupations as interest at the legal civil rate (article 11 of 
the Ordinance)).  
The practical implementation of the program faced three great difficulties, linked to 
the desire to accelerate procedures:  
– The project struggled to find good-quality agricultural land in the same villages as 
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in-kind compensation for cropland losses, although the farmers had already been 
displaced. This situation went against the principle of article 10 of OP 4.12, which 
recommends that affected persons not be moved until all relocation and compensa-
tion measures are ready. In the end, due to a lack of adequate agricultural land, these 
households were all compensated in cash; 
– The procedures of displaying names and taking inventory of the affected owners 
discriminated against those who did not live permanently in the affected villages, 
and some were not able to receive compensation; 
– The insufficient information sessions concerning the determination of compensa-
tion rates provoked social reactions from PAPs who felt wronged or swindled. These 
people repeatedly erected blockades, blocking the access of machines and workers 
to construction sites. These means of reclaiming their rights, which led to an increase 
in compensation rates, were appropriated and adopted by certain political groups. 
Blockades were thereafter used as a form of manipulation by the opposition against 
local leaders (regional representatives, mayors).  
b. Position and reactivity of users and owners  
When they are effectively consulted about registration projects and leases, the users and 
owners of land parcels – including titled and untitled private property – are able to assert 
their rights and influence the demarcation of lands targeted by operators. Preliminary 
case studies reveal the following points:  
° In most of the rural areas concerned, local land offices are not yet present or are still 
not effective. Even if farmers do not possess a certificate, they rightly consider them-
selves owners and oppose their lands being registered in the name of the State and 
transferred as part of a lease. The vigor of their demand depends on the type of plot:  
° Their refusal is categorical when it is concerns cultivated plots or arable plots, 
which will be needed by future generations. The operator must not use this land, 
even though he may say that he does not to want to encroach on it.18 While a 
consensus can be quickly reached between operator and villager, questions re-
main about the effective removal of these plots of land targeted by the investor 
and by the registration. There is a risk of conflict when demarcation procedures – 
the physical determination of the limits – begin; 
° The reaction of local people can also aim to defend the rights that they hold in 
common, particularly within the framework of a contract that transfers the man-
agement of natural resources in wooded areas.19 The situation studied in the 
                                                                  
18 The project leaders for Delta Petroli even stated that the good-quality, uncultivated arable land at the heart 
of the parcels transferred by the lease would be titled, in four-hectare plots, in the names of the farmers.  
19 The Minister of Water and Forests has established with local populations organized in “basic communities” 
(for which the acronym in Malagasy is “VOI”) contracts to transfer the management of natural resources. 
These contracts generally concern wooded areas. Certain contracts, established according to the terms of 
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Boeny region illustrates how the Ministry of Water and Forests supported the 
community’s opposition to a management contract (see Box 2); 
° The position concerning pastures for livestock use is more equivocal. The popula-
tion is often divided between a desire to see the project, perceived as a potential 
source of jobs, arrive and become established, and the desire to secure their land 
rights. Generally, pastures are the object of negotiation between operators and 
the local population – with the latter generally accepting that this land will be 
leased in exchange for compensation (preservation or development of new pas-
tures, production of grazing crops by the investor). Nevertheless, questions persist 
about the true participation of farmers in these negotiations and the effective re-
alization of commitments. Protests can be strong if the farmers’ agreement is not 
duly acquired or if the operator does not keep its promises. Several examples 
demonstrate opposition to the development of crops on village pastures once a 
project has begun. Plots have been damaged by bush fires: cases have been ob-
served in the Boeny region, where 1,500 hectares of a 2,000-hectare cashew plan-
tation were burned; likewise in Tuléar, where jatropha plantations covering about 
30,000 hectares were partially damaged by fire;  
° Owners with a private title deed have also taken action. In several cases where lease 
applications have encroached on titled private properties, disputes have been gener-
ated and resolved only through the intervention of regional representatives or State-
Owned Land Administration agents.  
° Representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture and Water and Forests have also 
shown their ability to oppose certain registration applications when development of 
the land might have harmful environmental impacts (particularly linked to deforesta-
tion). The risk is that the environmental argument is only a pretext in conflicts of a 
political nature between public service agents and elected representatives. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
the GELOSE law (secured local management), can if they are renewed lead to the registration of these lands 
in the name of the “basic community” after a period of ten years. 
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Photo 1: Land targeted for the development of a project in the Boeny region 
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Box 2: An example of contestation by public and technical services to secure 
natural resource management rights 
A Malagasy operator wished to acquire a 20,000-hectare area of land to develop a 
sugar cane production project. Having obtained the support of the main representa-
tive of the regional government, he presented his project to the relevant mayors and 
local populations. The mayor of the local government was hesitant because the 
targeted area included a forest area, managed by a VOI association within the 
framework of a natural resources management transfer contract.  
A few months later, the mayors were summoned by the main representative of the 
regional government, to obtain their agreement so that the operator could start his 
application for the land lease. By this point, the local government had a new mayor 
who, on the recommendation of the regional representative, agreed.  
The operator financed the topographic services to realize the plan. A Commission of 
State Ownership Recognition (CSOR) arrived on the land. Local residents and VOI 
members noticed the presence of the commission in the forest areas that they 
managed, and communicated their fears to the person in charge of their VOI group. 
This person then negotiated with the members of the commission and the operator, 
proposing that lands managed by the VOI be removed from the area requested. 
However, the CSOR did not formalize these exchanges in its report and did not 
modify the plan. The operator wanted to acquire a large area all in one piece to 
successfully conclude his agricultural and irrigation activities. He hoped that he could 
informally negotiate with the occupants of land included in the targeted zone.  
The application for registration, including the plan and the report, was then passed 
on to the regional offices of the relevant ministries, in particular those of Water and 
Forestry. Already having been informed by the regional representative of the VOI, the 
Ministry’s regional office exercised its veto and convened a meeting with all of the 
technical services concerned (Agriculture, Environment, Water and Forests, State-
Owned Land Administration).  
The following events are recounted differently depending on the interlocutors. For 
some, it was decided by the various technical services that the operator had to 
finance the modification of the plan (potentially removing more than 2,000 hectares) 
and a second visit by the Commission. For others, only the regional office of Water 
and Forests was in opposition, and did not have the support of either the Ministry or 
the VOI members. The VOI members, most of whom had already been employed by 
the private operator to initiate the agricultural work, would in fact have no interest in 
opposing the project’s development. Finally, for some, this opposition was the result 
of political conflicts between the various personalities involved. 
According to the business plan and the environmental impact assessment to be 
presented by the operator, the regional office of Water and Forests announced that 
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opposition to the registration application could be maintained and extended to all 
wooded areas. The desired zone was indeed rich in jujube trees, whose exploitation 
supplies Mahajanga with firewood and coal. The removal of the wooded areas could 
potentially reduce the targeted area by up to 80%. For some, the defense of such a 
position arose from economic advantages that the actors in the fuel wood value 
chain would not like to lose. 
In addition, even if the VOI members’ rights on lands were successfully respected, 
numerous questions remain concerning pastures or land reserves for the village’s 
future generations. Those villagers most involved in livestock breeding made their 
fears known, but did not protest enough for the grazing areas to be removed from 
the land to be leased to the investor. Two reasons explain this situation. First of all, 
the operator and his team promised the farmers that they would develop grazing 
areas on the edge of the village, with improved grazing. Second, the villagers did not 
want to oppose the project and hoped to see it developed in their village. According 
to the presentation they received, they saw the project as an opportunity to obtain 
jobs, to benefit from irrigation infrastructure, and to cultivate some sugar cane to sell 
to the operator. 
This case demonstrates the ability of a local population to react and their capacity to 
mobilize technical services to protect their land rights. But it also shows the popula-
tion’s divided positions between the possibility of accessing jobs and the protection 
of their land rights. It also highlights the fact that disputes can certainly be resolved 
between the State’s technical services and the Ministries, without involving the 
population. 
 
  
43 
Photos 2 and 3: Forest territories under natural resource management contracts 
(red circles) included in land targeted by the lease (blue delimitation) 
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Investors’ land security 
a. A long and costly process to access land and secure rights  
For investors, the objective is to formalize their land rights so as to obtain financing from 
their banks or their shareholders and, more broadly, to secure their investment. The 
procedures required demand significant financial and time investments by the investors.  
One part of this investment is incompressible. The effective security of investors’ land 
rights is strictly linked to that of land owners and residents. The absence of encroachment 
upon other individually or collectively claimed land significantly limits the risks of 
conflicts. The time dedicated to consultations and to negotiations with land owners and 
users cannot be reduced. Expenses incurred in carrying out inquiries for the CSOR, on the 
topographic survey, and on demarcation cannot be avoided.20 
Another part of the investment, on the other hand, depends on administrative efficiency. 
Due to a lack of harmonized processes and systematic coordination between the 
technical services, and because of the various institutional points of entry, operators 
receive different privileges or advice depending on which elected representative or civil 
servant they deal with. They complain that there are no clear directives regarding the 
nature and order of the documents they must supply. They must engage in a number of 
back-and-forth processes between the regional directors of the State-Owned Land 
Administration, topographic services, the mayors, the central State-Owned Land Adminis-
tration, ONE, and even the EDBM. Furthermore, because of the recent political transition 
and the appointment of new ministers, regional representatives, and senior officials, most 
operators have been forced to start their whole application over again. 
This lack of clarity for operators and the significant time dedicated to their cases some-
times offers the representatives of institutions the opportunity to profit from support for 
the operator. The investors encountered complained about frequent demands for 
financial and material compensation by certain State, regional, or local representatives, 
which add to the formal expenses of the administrative procedures. In situations where 
several operators were present, it was agreed that interlocutors would raise the stakes. 
The low price of rents (less than €1 per hectare), which is very attractive for operators, 
often masks the total costs involved in the preparation of a contract and its negotiation 
with local populations, regional and local governments, and technical services. To limit 
the initial investment (cost of demarcation and annual rent), operators have asked for 
                                                                  
20 Numerous questions arise about the time and costs required for the topographic services to succeed in 
demarcating plots of such scale. In the demarcation of a large area of land the realization of the topographic 
plan involves an enormous amount of work for the State-Owned Land Administration agents, given the 
human and material resources at their disposal. For example, Boeny’s topographic service has six people in 
total, who estimate that they can delimit at most 20 hectares a day if the terrain is not too rugged. For 20,000 
hectares of land, 1,000 working days would be necessary even if the service had no other cases to handle 
during this time.  
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progressive leases with the aim of gradually extending the land holding of their project 
(up to a predefined maximum area). 
b.  The lease contract: a theoretically sound securing of rights that is sometimes 
unpredictable  
In certain countries, land contracts established between lessees and the State seem 
extremely succinct, with documents running to less than one page (Cotula et al. 2009). In 
Madagascar lease contracts, based on examples of contracts discussed in the present 
study, can extend to five pages. Certainly, the number of pages does not guarantee the 
quality of the contract, but it can provide an idea. Numerous clauses specify the rights 
and duties of the lessee and of the State, and the conditions that can lead to the termina-
tion of the contract (e.g. unrealized planned work, defaulting on payment of rent). The 
contract is limited to the land dimension but makes reference to the impact assessments, 
which must be attached as an annex. Based on the lease contract, the operator’s land 
rights are guaranteed in theory by law.  
However, the risk of the State opportunistically breaking a lease contract and evicting the 
lessee is not unheard of in the Malagasy context. In the agricultural sector, certain 
symbolic cases of the State threatening to break a lease have already occurred.  
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5 Broadening the debate on 
a regulatory framework for 
investments  
Two models of development currently seem to be in opposition to one another. The first 
depends on national and foreign private investments to establish agribusiness activities, 
partially oriented towards exports, which their promoters hope will have positive effects 
on economic growth. The second is based on family farming and aims to strengthen 
food security by protecting existing rights and by promoting a set of public actions in 
support of farms. 
Reality shows that these two models coexist and are not going to disappear any time 
soon. The majority of the Malagasy population lives from family farming. Peasant societies 
have over centuries shaped rural areas in highly varied physical contexts, which attests to 
their adaptability. But it is also necessary to recognize that agribusinesses have been 
present in Madagascar since the colonial period and that it is very possible that new 
investors will reappear when the political situation stabilizes. Madagascar will not be 
spared by the strategies of land acquisition and, according to the point of view one 
adopts, will be integrated into the global investment dynamics that are currently being 
manifested in most Southern countries and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
The debates and issues involved do not need to be reduced to a bipolar and simplistic 
argument (for or against one model or the other), which reverts to discourses tainted 
with ideologies. The debates must, on the contrary, provide the elements for a policy of 
rural development that could combine both models. It is noted, moreover, that such 
combinations already exist and deserve to be better understood.  
The challenge is to accentuate the mutual interests of both investors and family farmers 
and to plan the principles and the institutional framework for agribusiness investment in 
Madagascar. This study, in its first observations, allows us to propose some ways forward. 
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Open a national debate on large 
land acquisitions 
Before presenting the themes for reflection, the methods of conducting this debate must 
be considered. The stakes are so important for the development of Madagascar, and the 
number of actors concerned is so high, that this debate must not be opened only to the 
government and its technical services, but also at the parliamentary level and through a 
process of consultation with civil society. This raises the following questions:  
° To inform these debates, how can we make transparent the information on large-
scale investments and analyses of past or current experiences at the national level and 
in other countries? What is the potential role of an observatory?  
° How can we ensure that public decision-makers, private operators, civil society, and 
especially farmers’ organizations and NGOs can follow the issues, express their opin-
ions, and participate in these debates? The example of the Platform for Sustainable 
Agrofuels is an interesting introductory experience. This dialogue process, bringing 
together representatives from ministries, investors, the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), and farmers’ organizations, was introduced to tackle the development of an 
agrofuels value chain in Madagascar. The initiative demonstrates the possibility of 
initiating a debate around the issues common to the various actors in the value chain 
and the cooperative building of regulation methods. How can this process be ex-
panded and strengthened? 
Debate agricultural policies  
Madagascar’s agricultural and land policies were already the subject of numerous 
discussions, which determined the directions of public policies. Considering the new 
context of land transfers to large agribusinesses, it is advisable to update the points to be 
addressed. The debate should be oriented according to the following questions:  
° Instead of assigning vast areas of land, can we promote models of production based 
on partnerships between private operators and local farmers, by contractual delega-
tion of agricultural production to farmers or by forming joint ventures? 
° How can we facilitate the combination of large-scale agricultural production and 
family farming, beyond the use of farm laborers? In particular, how can private opera-
tors be encouraged to provide support for the consolidation of local agricultural value 
chains? 
° What tools can encourage operators to supply the national market when the offer is 
insufficient (food commodity markets) or when value chain development is consid-
ered desirable (agrofuels)?  
° When the agricultural production envisaged by operators is destined for export and 
processing, how can investors be encouraged to realize the steps (or some of them) 
of processing at the national level?  
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Coordinate the selection and 
regulation of investors  
To facilitate the visibility of ongoing projects and the steps that investors have to follow, 
the nature and identity of the institutions in charge of regulating investors must be 
questioned.  
Harmonize the processes for investors 
a. Define a single institutional entry point? 
The regulation role devolved to the EDBM is not still respected by operators, especially 
since the functioning of this structure has become very slow, leading some investors to 
take other routes (national, regional, or local governments). Besides, no public institution 
has an overall vision of all the projects in preparation or underway:  
° The EBDM is really only aware of projects for which operators – almost exclusively 
foreign – have solicited its support for institutional direction and the identification of 
land suitable for investment. Furthermore, contact with operators ceased, for the 
most part, at the beginning of the political crisis of 2009 and the EDBM’s staff was 
significantly reduced following the withdrawal of funds by international lessees. At 
present, the EDBM is no longer really capable of identifying projects still in prepara-
tion or their level of progress; 
° The main representatives of regional governments are generally aware of current 
projects but, because some have only recently been appointed, the accuracy of their 
knowledge about projects and what they involve varies; 
° The State-Owned Land State-Owned Land Administration at the central level is aware 
only of projects that have initiated the process of applying for a lease. It does not nec-
essarily know of projects in preparation and does not have systematic information on 
small-scale projects, for which applications for registration or for leases is handled at 
the regional level; 
° Similarly, ONE knows only of projects that have entered the evaluation phase of their 
impact assessment. 
Faced with these observations, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and Decentra-
lization asked all main representatives of regional government to provide information 
about current projects. By March 2010, only some regions had replied.  
The following are the questions that must be addressed:  
° Can we be satisfied with the current diversity of procedures and institutions directing 
investments? What are the consequences of these disparate procedures? Is it relevant 
to define a compulsory institutional path and, if necessary, what must be done to 
encourage operators to follow it?  
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° What is the assessment of the EDBM in terms of receiving agribusiness investments? 
Will it be necessary to reactivate the EDBM or to envisage the creation of a new struc-
ture able to make the various investment projects coherent? With what resources? 
b. Define a standardized approach including local consultations? 
The current legislation mandates a passage through three institutions: the EDBM for 
administrative formalities, the State-Owned Land State-Owned Land Administration for 
access to land, and ONE for impact assessments. A synthesis of legal frameworks concern-
ing the rights and duties of operators, in addition to establishing the chronological order 
of the steps to be followed and documents to be obtained, could improve the visibility of 
operators, reinforce the work and coordination of the technical services, and facilitate the 
role of the monitoring organizations. 
Finally, operators have no obligation to consult local populations or local governments, 
except during the impact assessment phase. A reflection could be undertaken on ways to 
improve this consultation process and exchanges with populations and local authorities, 
as well as the formalization of commitments made during these exchanges.  
The questions to be addressed are the following: 
° In the perspective of systematic local consultations and a more detailed description of 
the procedures to be followed, is it necessary to revise the investment code and law 
of December 2007? What would be the specifications concerning the central ques-
tion of informing local populations? Can we aim to formulate these texts within the 
framework of a technical committee open to investor and civil society representa-
tives? 
° In particular, can we impose a consultative process at the local level before the steps 
to access land have begun?  
° How can we ensure that consultative processes lead to gathering valid information 
and to effective consultation with local communities and their representatives? How 
should the results of these consultations and exchanges be formalized? What is the 
possible role of a third party, which would accompany and oversee these processes, 
in this respect?  
Selecting projects 
ONE, along with the services of the Ministries concerned (Agriculture, Livestock Breeding 
and Fishing, Water and Forests, Environment, Town and Country Planning), requires an 
environmental, social, and economic impact assessment and can, by means of the 
specifications stipulated with the environmental license, propose certain adjustments 
(e.g. recommendations for local processing of products, employment of the local 
workforce).  
The questions to be addressed are the following: 
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° Can certain aspects of impact assessments (analysis of the opportunity costs of the 
land, the net number of jobs created, contribution to the objectives of agricultural 
policy, effects of training at the local level) be strengthened?  
° Is it desirable that a certified body should realize the impact assessment? If yes, which 
one? 
° Should the role of the Inter-ministerial Evaluation Commission for impact assessments 
be extended to the selection of projects? If necessary, on what criteria (economic 
viability of the project, its potential social impacts, the methods of agricultural pro-
duction envisaged, the company’s reputation in respect of fundamental international 
rights, its adherence to voluntary procedures, etc.)?  
Regulate access to land and secure 
existing land rights 
In order to control the development of large-scale agricultural exploitation and, especial-
ly, to limit competition between land uses, many ministerial agents would like to 
preemptively identify land dedicated to investment.  
While this appears to be an interesting option, it faces major difficulties in implementa-
tion. It is difficult to define a priori zones of investment:  
° If they are to be reliable, precise, and useful, maps that identify both pedo-climatic 
zones suitable for agricultural crops and land use methods are expensive to produce 
(it is difficult to establish soil properties: quality, slope, depth, image analysis level to 
identify the land uses). The definition of arable lands varies and deserves genuine 
reflection in the Malagasy context: does it include zones currently used for grazing? Is 
it limited to flat lands? Does it include lands for which the level of inputs must be 
increased to ensure a minimal return? Furthermore, modes of land occupation (prai-
ries, savannas, forests) supply no information about effective land use or modes of 
ownership; land areas reserved for grazing, fallow land, or fuel wood reserves are par-
ticularly hard to identify. 
° Regional planning schemes enable the organization of an area’s development. They 
can lead to the demarcation of investment zones but can encounter difficulties in 
precisely identifying unoccupied land areas on a map.  
° The definition of zones dedicated to agricultural investment can be difficult to enforce 
in practice.  
It seems thus more effective to reflect on pragmatic procedures to oversee the recogni-
tion and securing of existing land rights and, particularly in zones targeted by investors, to 
look at these from the perspective of land contracts with the populations that hold these 
rights.  
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A number of procedures exist to regulate investors’ access to land, notably concerning 
the means of accessing leases. The ongoing land reform is a major advance towards 
recognizing and securing usage rights, and can only be encouraged.  
However, this study accentuates the need to debate the following points:  
° In situations where local land offices are not yet present and where not all plots are 
secured by a certificate, what possible ways are there to identify land needed by fu-
ture generations of farmers, for pasture, for fallow use, for fuel wood supply? What are 
the possible rules of exclusion and compensation for land that is subject to registra-
tion?  
° Is it necessary to open the Commission of State Ownership Recognition to more 
actors: representatives chosen by villagers; members of the local land office as well as 
expert witnesses to oversee the proper progression of procedures and the broader 
dissemination of information about lease projects?  
° How can legal advice facilitated for users, owners, and local governments during 
negotiations with private operators? Who would finance this service? Who has the 
capacity for such a role? 
° Under what conditions can land transfer lead to the expropriation of users’ or owners’ 
land? What are the compensation procedures? 
° What role can the local land office play in the mediation and prevention of conflicts 
between local populations, operators, and the State-Owned Land State-Owned Land 
Administration? Can investors contribute financially – through local taxes or through 
direct subsidies – to the creation or functioning of local land offices? 
Define parties’ commitments  
At the moment, the lease contract established between operators and the State is 
accompanied by a list of requirements. A first point for reflection concerns the nature of 
the commitments established between operators, the State, and consequently regional 
and the local governments and local populations:  
° Concerning the lease contract: reflections, already initiated within the Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning and Decentralization, could be pursued on:  
° The amount of rental royalties, and their distribution between regional and local 
governments and the State,  
° The duration of the lease, respecting the time needed by an investor to obtain a 
good return on investment (stating a duration of 30 years); 
° Concerning the commitments of investors, the debatable points are the following: 
° Should investors’ commitments include social measures and/or rely on taxation 
tools that aim to redistribute the wealth created?  
° If they include social measures, how and by whom are these defined? During the 
consultation processes undertaken during the impact assessment? 
° Should these economic and social measures be quantified and subject to a pre-
cise timeline? Are they only mentioned in the list of requirements or should they 
be contained in an explicit contract as for accessing land (the lease)? 
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Ensure methods for assessing the 
commitments of the various parties  
The final elements for reflection concern the methods for assessing the commitments of 
the various parties involved (operators, State, population) and for resolving disputes.  
° Which institutions and organizations are in charge of monitoring and evaluation and 
dispute resolution (local government, regional monitoring and evaluation units, 
monitoring and evaluation units of the various ministries, ONE)? How can they be 
coordinated?  
° Knowing that reputation is an important factor for companies, how could the 
dissemination of information be facilitated concerning operators’ practices to pro-
mote companies that respect the rights of populations and the environment, and 
stigmatize those that do not?  
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Conclusions 
This inventory of the establishment of agribusiness projects and the ensuing dynamics of 
land acquisition allows for a first set of lessons to be drawn. 
The establishment of agro-industries and the transfer of lands is a national issue of 
the very first order.  
The question of foreign and national investments in agriculture goes beyond the 
agricultural sector alone and assumes a national strategic importance. Successfully 
integrating agribusiness projects is probably one of the keys to Madagascar’s economic 
development. By contrast, any failure in this area could lead to grave economic and social 
consequences harmful to rural populations, as well as to investors and to public authori-
ties. This question raises issues not only in terms of economic growth, but also of social 
peace. The highest institutions of the State, within the framework of national debates, 
have to tackle this issue in order to define multi-sector-oriented development policies 
that favor investment, while guaranteeing protection of the rights and interests of the 
populations concerned. Making legal and institutional frameworks coherent emerges as a 
priority to guarantee economically favorable results for communities, local governments, 
public authorities, and investors. 
Opacity does not pay.  
The logic of investors who do not wish to reveal details of their projects in a competitive 
environment is understandable, but the unfortunate experience of the negotiations led 
by Daewoo and Varun demonstrates the patent failure of projects implemented in 
secrecy. The confidentiality clauses stipulated in contracts agreed to by these two 
companies perhaps protected them from the strategies of rival firms, but they also led to 
the emergence of rumors and suspicions, and did not succeed in keeping the investors’ 
intentions secret (on the contrary, the whole world was informed about the Daewoo 
project). This empty hope of confidentiality is moreover contradictory with the scale of 
such projects. How could anyone believe that surveying hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of land, made visible by the work of several teams of surveyors, would go 
unnoticed, especially in rural areas where the risk of despoliation of land is a traumatizing 
reality? It is in investors’ interests to engage in genuinely transparent negotiations with 
the populations concerned; confidentiality on the subject guarantees the failure of 
projects before they even begin. 
The anticipated momentum of land acquisition projects has not materialized.  
Currently, less than 1% of the land targeted between 2005 and 2009 by 52 agribusiness 
projects is being cultivated. The political crisis that Madagascar is experiencing is one of 
the main explanatory factors for the cancelation of numerous projects, particularly 
because of banks’ unfavorable risk assessments for the financing of agribusiness projects. 
The power of the media in orchestrating social protest has been another determining 
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factor. From now on, any company that intends to limit risks to its reputation will have to 
take into account, from the outset of any new investment project, civil society’s ability to 
react, the efficiency of its international intermediaries, and the communication opportun-
ities offered by the Internet. The globalization of strategies to control land has been 
accompanied by a globalization of protests against them. 
Is there really “cultivable land” without rights and infinitely available?  
One must wonder about the real extent of arable land that is still unused and suitable for 
exploitation by agribusiness. Certain statistics that claim that 95% of arable land is not 
cultivated undoubtedly need to be revised. These figures have a political connotation: 
they can justify the transfer of large land areas under the pretext of impacting only a very 
small proportion of all cultivable land. On the ground, the reality seems different and “un-
cultivated arable land” is sought to the extent that investors are sometimes in competi-
tion with one another to obtain the same land. In future debates, it is advisable to revisit 
the notion of “arable land”, by recalling that Malagasy rural areas are rarely without rights. 
Strategies are needed to strengthen local communities’ rights.  
The roles of the State, NGOs, and civil society still seem very weak, even absent, insofar as 
protecting communities and strengthening their negation capacities are concerned. 
Access to information is severely lacking at the level of local populations, who do not 
have legal assistance to negotiate employment contracts, establish lease contracts, or 
protect their vital spaces (water resources, pasture land, family farms, fuel wood reserves, 
etc.). Lessons concerning “win-win” contracts that allow the inclusion of populations in 
decision-making can be drawn from other African countries. 
This study should to be considered as the first step in a longer process needed for the 
conception of a regulatory framework for agribusiness investments. This framework is 
one element of a rural development policy that should favor investments that integrate 
family agriculture.  
The next steps proposed to follow this study could be organized in a process comprising 
three phases:  
i. Information about the strategies of establishing agribusiness operations and the 
conception of a regulatory framework for investments; 
ii. Debating and defining directions; 
iii. Joint definition of a regulatory framework. 
It is a question of:  
° Determining the skills to assemble in an entity to reflect upon and conceptualize a 
regulatory framework for agribusiness investments. The Sustainable Agrofuel Plat-
form, the Land Observatory, the EDBM, ONE, and relevant ministries could be mobi-
lized to establish this national capacity; 
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° Continuing to gather information about the current processes of large-scale land 
acquisition and the establishment of agribusinesses, to identify Malagasy agribusiness 
models that allow for the consolidation of agricultural value chains and the integra-
tion of family agriculture; 
° Proposing directions to establish the basic principles of a regulatory framework for 
investments; 
° Encouraging a national debate on the directions of rural policy development, and 
particularly land policy, protecting existing rights and welcoming international capital; 
and opening this debate not only to actors in the sectors concerned but also to a 
variety of civil society representatives, to complete or revise a national rural develop-
ment policy. 
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Annex: List of projects announced since 2005   
Sector Project name Origin Region Production Area targeted (ha) 
Area devel-
oped (ha) Mode of production 
Market 
targeted Status 
Ag
ro
-fo
od
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
         
Daewoo Logistics South Korea 
Melaky - Menabe - 
Atsinanana Maize 1,300,000 0 Large-scale farming  Export STOPPED 
Varun India Sofia Rice, maize, lentils  230,000 0 
Large-scale/centralized + 
peasant-based  Export STOPPED 
Monteverde Mauritus Analamanga Potato 1,000 N/A Large-scale farming N/A STOPPED 
ERS Mauritus Vakinankaratra Potato, carrot N/A 0  Export STOPPED 
Unitech USA Sofia Sunflower 150,000 0  Large-scale farming  N/A STOPPED 
Land Mark  India Ihorombe Maize 5,000 1,000  Large-scale farming  
Local + 
export ONGOING 
Groupe Caillé 
France (Reunion 
Islands) Analamanga 
Potato, dried beans, 
legumes 300 N/A Large-scale farming  Export ONGOING 
Madabeef United Kingdom 
Menabe - Atsimo 
Andrefana Beef cattle 200,000 0  N/A Export PREPARATION 
Domaine du 
lémurien Mauritus Anosy Legumes 1,000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Soabe France Atsimo Andrefana Cereals, legumes  4,500 N/A Large-scale farming N/A N/A 
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Project Name Origin  Region  Production  
Area targeted 
(ha) 
Area devel-
oped (ha) 
Mode of produc-
tion  
Market 
targeted Status 
Ag
ro
fu
el
: j
at
ro
ph
a 
MCD (ex-D1) 
Madagascar - 
United Kingdom 
Boeny Alaotra Vakinan-
karatra Jatropha 600 50 
Large-scale 
farming (50)  
contract farming 
(550) Local ONGOING 
DRAMCO Madagascar Boeny Jatropha + coconut 810 0 
Large-scale 
farming N/A PREPARATION 
Magnard France Atsimo Andrefana Jatropha 1,200 0 N/A Local N/A 
Vaudo France Boeny Jatropha 1,500 0 
Large-scale 
farming N/A PREPARATION 
Bioenergy Invest Madagascar  Boeny Jatropha 2,000 2*49 
Large-scale 
farming N/A STOPPED 
Association "Soava 
dia" Madagascar Boeny  Jatropha 2,000 0  Local PREPARATION 
Jatro Solutions Germany Haute Matsiatra Jatropha 3,000 N/A 
Large-scale 
farming N/A ONGOING 
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Project name Origin Region  Production  
Area 
targeted  (ha) 
Area 
developed  (ha) Production mode  Markets targeted Status 
Ag
ro
fu
el
: j
at
ro
ph
a 
J – Oils  France Diana Jatropha 10,000 
Less than 100 large-scale 
farming 
Large-scale farming +  
contract farming Export ONGOING 
JSL Germany Boeny Jatropha 10,000 N/A 
Large-scale farming +  
contract farming N/A ONGOING 
Avana Group  United Kingdom Bongolava Jatropha 10,000 N/A Large-scale farming  N/A PREPARATION 
NOTS Holland Betsiboka Jatropha 15,000 N/A 
Large-scale farming + 
contract farming Local N/A 
Delta Petroli Italy Sofia Jatropha 20,000 300 Large-scale farming Export ONGOING 
Fuel Stock  United Kingdom Boeny Jatropha 30,000 More than 100 Large-scale farming Export ONGOING  
NEO  France Bongolava Jatropha 30,000 10 Large-scale farming Export PREPARATION 
Flora Eco Power  Israel Boeny  Jatropha 30,000 600 Large-scale farming Export STOPPED 
GEM United Kingdom Atsimo Andrefana Jatropha 50,000 20,000 Large-scale farming Export ONGOING 
TRE Italy  Atsimo Andrefana Jatropha 80,000 0 Large-scale farming Export STOPPED 
Global Agro-fuel  Lebanon Boeny et Sofia Jatropha 100,000 0 Large-scale farming Export N/A 
Bio Energy Limited 
(BEL) John Bizeray Australia Sofia Jatropha 120,000 300 Large-scale farming Export PREPARATION 
Daewoo Logistics South Korea Sava Atsinanana Palm tree 300,000 0 Large-scale farming Export STOPPED 
Southern 
Hemisphere 
Madagascar-
Belgium N/A Jatropha N/A N/A Contract farming Local ONGOING 
J and J South Africa N/A Palm tree N/A 0 Large-scale farming Local + export STOPPED 
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 Project name Origin  Region  Production  
Area 
targeted 
(ha) 
Area 
developed  
(ha) 
Mode of  
production  Targeted market Status  
Ag
ro
fu
el
: s
ug
ar
 c
an
e 
Sopremad Madagascar - 
France 
Boeny Sugar cane 20,000 5*50 Large-scale +  
contract farming 
Local + export ONGOING 
JWE Madagascar Boeny Sugar cane 20 20 Contract farming Local + export PREPARATION 
SITEC Brickaville Madagascar Atsinanana Sugar cane 20 20 Contract farming Local + export PREPARATION 
SAIM Madagascar Diana - Sava Sugar cane 1,520 1,500 large-scale 
farming+ 20 factory 
Large-scale +  
contract farming 
Local + export PREPARATION 
SITEC Farafangana Madagascar Atsimo Andrefana Sugar cane 20  Contract farming Local + export PREPARATION 
E-Kolo Madagascar Atsinanana Sugar cane 20 In discussions Contract farming Local + export PREPARATION 
Madagascar 
Industries 
Madagascar Boeny Sugar cane 20  Farmer Local + export PREPARATION 
TF Sarl Madagascar Diego Sugar cane N/A N/A N/A Local + export N/A 
Malagasy Green 
Energy 
Madagascar Atsinanana Sugar cane 20 N/A Farmer Local + export PREPARATION 
Tora Green Industry Madagascar Atsinanana Sugar cane 20 N/A Farmer Local + export PREPARATION 
GEAR Madagascar  Sugar cane N/A N/A  N/A STOPPED 
ULEM Madagascar  Sugar cane  N/A Farmer Local STOPPED 
Osho group South Africa Menabe Sugar cane 100,000 N/A NA Export ? 
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Project name Origin of investor Region   Production  
Area 
targeted (ha) 
Area 
developed 
(ha) 
Mode of  
production  
Market 
targeted Status 
Fo
re
st
ry
 
Oji Paper Japan Atsinanana Eucalyptus - acacia 30,000 0 
Large-scale  
plantation Export STOPPED 
DRT France Moramaga Pine resin 15,000 * Concession  Export STOPPED 
Mada Woodland Norway Sofia N/A N/A N/A Farmer N/A ONGOING 
DEKO SA South Africa 
Alaotra  
Mangoro Pine 33,000 0 
Large-scale  
plantation Export N/A 
Minergy Resources NA Anosy N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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